The Esfahan Uranium Conversion Facility

Welcome

This website seeks to make available in a single location a broad array of information about Iran's nuclear program, from its history dating back to the 1960s, to the ongoing swirl of diplomatic activity aimed at halting its uranium enrichment activity, to commercial satellite imagery and ground photos of nuclear-related sites. The Nuclear Sites section provides information and, where available, images, about the many facilities that make up its nuclear program. From the Sky is an interactive tool we have developed using Google maps that allows users to see a broad, annotated overview of Iran's facilities. NuclearIran News offers brief analysis and commentary on recent developments. All ISIS reports on Iran's nuclear program are provided below under the Iran Reports tab. The Documents section contains links to every IAEA report on Iran since 2003, as well as United Nations Security Council resolutions and the texts of various diplomatic initiatives generated by Iran, the European Union and others. The FAQ section answers frequently asked questions about Iran's nuclear program and the nuclear fuel cycle. We invite readers to visit the Links section which lists many other websites and blogs dedicated to Iran and/or issues of nonproliferation.

This site was made possible by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation. It continues to be a work in progress and we welcome suggestions from readers about items to include.

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    • February 19, 2009
      ISIS Analysis of the February 19 IAEA Report

      ISIS analyzes the three main subjects of the latest IAEA report on Iran: the increase in the number of installed centrifuges, the current amount of LEU and the progress of the Arak heavy reactor plant. 

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    • February 11, 2009
      Is Iran running out of yellowcake?

      Iran could be close to exhausting its supply of yellowcake while lacking the adequate resources to sustain indigenous commercial-scale uranium processing and enrichment. Our conclusion, echoed in a recent report by Mark Hibbs in Nuclear Fuel,1 is based on an examination of Iran’s uranium reserves, its stocks of yellowcake, or uranium oxide, acquired from overseas sources and, the requirements to sustain a commercial nuclear power program. The absence of activity at one of Iran’s two uranium mines casts further doubt on its claims that it can establish independence in the fuel cycle required for a civil nuclear energy program.

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    • January 28, 2009
      A Company’s Discretion Detects Large Iranian Valve Orders

      In this case, a company used its knowledge about its products’ end uses as well as its expertise in identifying suspicious equipment requests to detect Iranian attempts to procure a large number of valves for its gas centrifuge program. The illicit procurement agents requested items not on international control lists of dual-use items, hoping to evade detection while still obtaining equipment adequate for use in a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant.

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    • January 21, 2009
      Nuclear Iran:  Not Inevitable

      Few foreign policy and national security issues have dominated debate in the United States and abroad as Iran’s nuclear program has.  Is its declared civil uranium enrichment program a cover for an effort to secretly build nuclear weapons?  What should be done to stop Iran from developing a capability to build nuclear weapons?  The Obama administration faces a formidable and urgent challenge to sculpt a policy that can convince Iran to abandon or defer a nuclear weapons capability.  This report seeks to answer several key questions about how much Iran has achieved.  It also offers a roadmap for resolving the nuclear issue both peacefully and in a manner that would redirect Iran away from proliferation-sensitive parts of the fuel cycle, in particular uranium enrichment, while strengthening international monitoring of its nuclear capabilities.  Part I of this report contains an overview of Iran’s uranium enrichment program with an emphasis on questions related to Iran’s nuclear weapons capability, including when it might achieve such a capability and the state of evidence suggesting research and development of a weapons program.  Part II looks to the recent nuclear histories of Pakistan and South Africa as possible futures for Iran’s nuclear program and draws out key lessons from those experiences.  Part III offers a detailed set of recommendations and specific steps that the incoming administration should consider as it seeks to confront the specific challenges posed by Iran’s nuclear program in a wider context of competing regional political and security concerns.

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