http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/ en avagyan@isis-online.org Copyright 2012 2012-08-29T14:13:03+00:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/detail/irans-heading-of-the-non-aligned-movement-lead-up-to-more-confrontation/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/irans-heading-of-the-non-aligned-movement-lead-up-to-more-confrontation/#When:13:13:03Z By Andrew Ortendahl and Andrea Stricker Iran recently took over leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a 120-nation consortium of developing countries, for a period of three years.  Iran is now hosting the group’s 16th Summit in Tehran where member states are gathered to discuss issues of mutual importance.  However, it is disappointing given Iran’s intransigence about its unresolved nuclear case that so many member states decided to send top-level representation.  Those attending should deliver a clear message to Iran that its many violations of U.N. Security Council resolutions and lack of transparency with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are unacceptable and a blemish on the NAM’s struggle for the peaceful resolutions of conflicts. Iran reportedly views its tenure as the NAM chair, and in particular this conference in Tehran, as an opportunity to garner an international platform for its views about the nuclear crisis, a venue it craves after being shut out of many forums due to the ongoing confrontation over its nuclear program.  Iran has sought to use this conference as a way to denounce economic and financial sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council and Western nations and to try to create new economic alliances.  In a few years, it is possible that Iran may also seize the opportunity as NAM chair to attempt to derail consensus at the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. At the NAM Summit, Iran has already attempted to gather support for its point of view by calling on member states to support its falsely asserted an unconditional “right” to peaceful nuclear energy, a right it does not have under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi also called on the NAM to “seriously confront financial sanctions by certain countries,” which in fact are legitimately imposed under U.N. Security Council resolutions and national laws.  Iran has sought to undermine the IAEA’s safeguards obligations among NAM members by falsely representing its nonproliferation commitments under the NPT. As it faces increasing economic isolation, Iran is also endeavoring to strengthen trade ties with countries as a way to help alleviate the effects of U.N. and unilateral sanctions, including denial of access to financial markets and oil embargoes.  Toward that goal, it has had potentially promising negotiations with countries such as Nigeria.  Iran’s leadership of the NAM presents yet another, more long-term risk: it could seek to derail consensus at the 2015 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference. The Conference, which is a forum for assessing the implementation of the NPT, could be exploited by Iran as a podium to further disrupt and distract from any scrutiny over its nuclear program.  In 2010, Egypt (and Iran) held up deliberations over concerns about holding a conference to discuss a Middle East nuclear weapons free zone.  Under its temporary NAM chairmanship, Iran will have the opportunity to shape the discourse at the next Review Conference even more dramatically and shift focus from its nuclear program.  As disappointing as their decisions to attend the Tehran summit are, the NAM states, as well as important international figures such as UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, should resist Iran’s defiance over sanctions and its commitments to the IAEA as well as overtures to make new trade deals. Instead, they should use this opportunity to criticize Iran over its nuclear policies, appealing to it to resolve the issue through serious negotiations.  Especially in the face of increased talk of a military strike on Iran, the NAM should not allow Iran to transfer focus away from its nonproliferation responsibilities. 2012-08-29T13:13:03+00:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/detail/support-the-reformist-call-for-a-national-referendum-over-irans-nuclear-pro/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/support-the-reformist-call-for-a-national-referendum-over-irans-nuclear-pro/#When:12:46:08Z An Economically Misguided Nuclear Program is Not Worth the Suffering By Lyle Bacaltos and Andrea Stricker   On July 10, 2012 Abdollah Nouri, an Iranian reformist politician and cleric, proposed that Iran hold a national referendum that would give the Iranian people the power to decide the future of Iran’s nuclear program. 1 He argued that recent economic sanctions against Iran combined with threats of war were starting to have detrimental effects. Publics around the world and in Iran should support Nouri’s call, despite the unlikelihood of the Iranian regime holding a referendum that would truly let the people of Iran decide the future of the country’s nuclear policy.  Nonetheless, an Iranian national debate on the nuclear issue is long overdue, and Nouri’s call is a step in the right direction.  The Iranian regime started its centrifuge program, the most sensitive part of the nuclear program, under great secrecy in the mid-1980s, revealing it publicly only in 2003 under intense international pressure.  It has hidden the true costs of its centrifuge and associated facilities behind a nationalist smokescreen, preferring to confront the West rather than face the fact that the program is uneconomical and often incompetent.  Unless the real reason the regime pursues this program is to build nuclear weapons the centrifuge program serves no worthwhile purpose.  The Iranian people should decide if it is worth the costs. It is also time for reformists and others to stop defending the charade of Iran’s “fundamental right” to uranium enrichment. Iran does not have a right to enrich uranium under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the regime falsely claims.  The NPT provides a conditional right to nuclear energy, including enrichment, based on the state being in conformity with Articles I and II; the latter prohibits non-nuclear weapon states such as Iran from building nuclear weapons. 2 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has stated for years that Iran’s compliance with Article II is in doubt. Thus, the IAEA and the U.N. Security Council have judged that they are well within their legal mandate to demand a suspension to Iran’s centrifuge program and more transparency over its entire nuclear program, including past and possibly on-going activities related to building nuclear weapons.  It is wrong to defend Iran’s centrifuge program as a “right.” This obvious distortion serves mainly to intensify the suffering of the Iranian people and block any resolution of this controversy with the international community. Reformists and pragmatists both in Iran and abroad should instead focus on Nouri’s argument that the nuclear issue should not be allowed to “threaten all of (Iran’s) national interests.”  The need for all to question the costs and benefits of the Iranian regime’s nuclear program is essential.  Established Iranian political figures are increasingly acknowledging the hardship imposed by economic sanctions on Iran.  On July 23, Iranian Minister of Industries and Business Mehdi Ghazanfari stated, “The enemy has put his fingers on the main arteries of the country’s economy and is now implementing comprehensive sanctions.” 3  In remarks about recent sanctions approved by the U.S. Congress, the head of Iran’s Central Bank, Mahmoud Bahmani, said, “Sanctions mean nothing short of military war, and we need to begin a series of irregular economic war policies.” 4  President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad acknowledged on July 3 that the sanctions imposed on Iran, which are costing Iran around $48 billion in revenue, or 10 percent of its economy, are “the harshest ever imposed on a country.” 5  Few dispute that the sanctions are taking an increasing toll on the Iranian economy. Even so Ayatollah Ali Khamenei notably remains obstinate to changing Iran’s nuclear policies.  In an Iran state television broadcast, he said, “They (the West) explicitly say they need to increase pressures, tighten sanctions to force Iranian authorities to reconsider their calculations. But a look at the facts leads us not only to avoid reconsidering our calculations, but to move on our intended path with greater confidence.” 6 Ayatollah Ahmad Janati, the hardline chief of Iran’s influential Guardians Council, said officials under the supervision of the Supreme Leader were tackling the crisis, and he urged national media to avoid “pessimistic” news and instead focus on stories that “make people happy, hopeful and boost their morale.” 7  But why anyone supports such misguided responses in the face of painful sanctions is not evident. Iran’s centrifuge program remains an uneconomical and unnecessary way to produce low enriched uranium for Iran’s nuclear reactors or medical needs.  For a decade, the regime has squandered huge amounts of funds with the pseudo promise of producing large amounts of low enriched uranium for indigenous commercial nuclear power reactors.  It is unlikely to ever realize this objective without the expenditure of even more enormous sums and likely dramatically worsened safety problems in any Iranian domestically produced nuclear power reactors.  Now Iran argues it needs to produce enriched uranium for research reactor fuel, but this requirement is actually miniscule and also unnecessary when judged against the massive investment in centrifuges already undertaken.  All these costs and risks can be easily avoided by importing both reactors and enriched uranium fuel.  Today, Iran would lose nothing by opting to buy enriched uranium or medical isotopes from abroad, unless of course the true aim of the program is to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.  In that case, the existing centrifuge program is large enough to produce highly enriched uranium for a small nuclear arsenal. If nuclear weapons are the true aim of the program Nouri’s idea for a national referendum is even more important.  The costs of building nuclear weapons will be devastating for Iran, including harsher economic and political sanctions and likely military strikes. There appear to be more and more people in Iran who believe that the country’s economic future is not worth the pain of sanctions and the risk of war over the regime’s existing nuclear program.  Their voices should be encouraged.  For more on Nouri’s comments, see excerpts from his presentation published by The Iran Primer.     1. “Reformist Challenges Iran’s Nuclear Program,” The Iran Primer, United States Institute of Peace, July 13, 2012. 2. Article IV.1: Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty. 3. Hossein Mohammadi, “Iranian Officials Now Repeatedly Acknowledge: The Sanctions are Devastating,” Payvand Iran News, July 23, 2012. 4. Mahmoud Bahmani, “Sanctions No Less than Military War: Central Bank Chief ,” Radio Zamaneh,  July 31, 2012. 5. Anthony DiPaola , “Iran Loses $133 Million A Day On Embargo, Buoying Obama” Bloomberg. August 2, 2012. 6. Ali Akhbar Dareini, “Iran Sanctions: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei Says Sanctions Will Not Alter Nuclear Program ,” The Associated Press. July 25, 2012. 7. Mohammad Davari. “‘This is War’: Iran Feels Impact of Sanctions,” The Daily Star, August 4, 2012. 2012-08-20T12:46:08+00:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/detail/potential-change-in-irans-nuclear-fatwa/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/potential-change-in-irans-nuclear-fatwa/#When:13:33:03Z By Lyle Bacaltos An official Iranian statement released on August 9, 2005 at a meeting with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) claimed that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa forbidding the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons. Recent news reports have raised the question whether the fatwa has changed. Based on research on news stories and commentary by Iranian officials from the past few months, there is no publicly available evidence that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has changed the nuclear fatwa. Whether the Ayatollah considers the fatwa a changeable edict is not open to question, because he may change it if he thinks the national security interests of Iran are threatened. Two recent articles and an essay raise the issue in the public mind that the Iranian fatwa may have changed.  The first,  “Islamic world must have nuclear weapons, says Iran,” by Reza Kahlili of The Daily Caller, focuses on an essay, “The Necessity for the Islamic World to have the Atomic Bomb” by Alireza Forghani, a former governor of southern Iran’s Kish Province and a strategist allied with the Supreme Leader.  An editorial by Mohammad Kazem Anbarlu’I, “The Peaceful Nuclear Bomb!” published on June 21, 2012 by Iranian news source, Resalat Online, suggests that the West is pushing Iran through military threats to change the fatwa and build nuclear weapons.  Neither the articles nor the essay referred to by Kahlili contain any information suggesting the Ayatollah’s fatwa has changed. In order to understand the fatwa’s current status, it is important to consider recent official statements by Iran during ongoing P5+1 negotiations, statements which would be closely aligned with the Supreme Leader’s position.  In a June 12, 2012 article by Mehr News Agency, entitled, “Reneging On Agreements With Iran Would Be Detrimental For 5+1 Group,” Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Saeed Jalili, who is Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator,  explains a five point proposal put forth during P5+1 talks : “The proposal of the Islamic Republic of Iran included five points that were about recognition of Iran’s right to peaceful use of nuclear energy, cooperation with the (International Atomic Energy) Agency, building confidence, nuclear cooperation, and discussion of non-nuclear issues, including regional issues.”  Jalili continued that the nuclear fatwa supports that Iran’s uranium enrichment processes are intended for peaceful purposes.  Later that month at talks in Moscow between the P5+1 and Iran, Iran again discussed the fatwa in a presentation titled “A framework for comprehensive and targeted dialogue for long term dialogue among 7 countries.”  The presentation states under a section entitled “Guidelines:” “The Islamic Republic of Iran emphasizes once again on its commitments under the NPT and its opposition to nuclear weapons based on the Supreme Leader’s Fatwa against such weapons.” To date, no official Iranian statements support that the nuclear fatwa has changed.  This does not suggest that it cannot change or that the Ayatollah will not change it in the future.  The IAEA has internal evidence from 1984 indicating that the Supreme Leader, while president, announced and supported the then-Supreme Leader’s decision to authorize the development of nuclear weapons, calling them a “deterrent in the hands of God’s soldiers.”  The fact that the fatwa is being used in negotiations as a justification for Iran’s continued enrichment suggests that it remains in place for now.  Only time will tell if the religious declaration is binding in any meaningful way or a truthful statement about the Supreme Leader’s intentions. 2012-08-02T13:33:03+00:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/detail/the-physics-research-center-telexes-new-isis-studies-and-findings/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/the-physics-research-center-telexes-new-isis-studies-and-findings/#When:13:01:00Z ISIS is releasing four new reports based on its further assessment of a set of about 1,600 telexes detailing the procurement activities of Iran’s Physics Research Center (PHRC) in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  The information in these telexes and evidence gathered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) support that the PHRC managed a parallel, secret military nuclear program in the 1990s whose long-term aim was to lay the basis for Iran’s development of nuclear weapons. The new evidence of Iran’s early, secret military nuclear program reinforces the need for Iran to explain its past efforts and come clean on any on-going nuclear weapons activities.  Only by understanding Iran’s past military nuclear activities can confidence develop that Iran is not seeking nuclear weapons today.  Revelations about the activities of the PHRC are a good place to start, as discussed in a report by Olli Heinonen and Albright. An Iranian decision to address forthrightly and cooperatively the PHRC issues would help build confidence that the difficult negotiating process starting between the P5+1 and Iran has a chance of ensuring that Iran is not seeking nuclear weapons. The four new reports by David Albright and Paul Brannan are: 1) Iranian Smuggling for Military Nuclear Programs:    From Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group to the Physics Research Center 2) The Telexes: Whole Body Counters and the Physics Research Center 3) The Telexes: Front Company Kala Naft 4) Telexes: Amir Kabir University and Dr. Shahmoradi Earlier ISIS analysis is in two reports on the ISIS web site, here and here, and in a Washington Post article.  Supplements on the web site contain the telexes discussed in each report and are available here. New Findings The 1,600 telexes provide a detailed snapshot of the PHRC’s wide-ranging overseas procurement efforts in the late 1980s and early 1990s and its focus on acquiring the wherewithal for many aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. The telexes outline efforts to acquire goods for gas centrifuges, uranium conversion, and heavy water production, computer codes useful to a nuclear weapons program, and scientific and engineering information important to developing the nuclear fuel cycle. These telexes are a unique set that can be freely discussed and assessed. These new ISIS studies reinforce that Iran needs to update and correct its declaration to the IAEA about the PHRC and its head, Sayyed Abbas Shahmoradi-Zavareh. One major shortcoming in Iran’s previous declaration to the IAEA is the denial that the PHRC and Shahmoradi used Sharif University of Technology as a purchasing front. The new ISIS reports support that the PHRC was buying for itself and using Sharif University of Technology as a front to facilitate the purchase of certain goods overseas. The university served to hide the true end use from overseas suppliers by providing an educational rationale for the purchases.  Telexes reveal that while the initial order came from Sharif University’s purchasing department, as the time came to finalize payments, PHRC and its head, Shahmoradi, appeared in financial-related telexes as the responsible party. Moreover, an earlier ISIS report charted the decrease in the use of Sharif University in PHRC procurements after international media accounts in 1993 charged that the university was buying for a secret gas centrifuge program. Special Role of Ali Akhbar Salehi while Head of Sharif University Although Sharif University was a front, it was complicit in PHRC’s procurements.  Moreover, the new reports and the other telexes also indicate that Ali Akhbar Salehi, Iran’s current Foreign Minister and former head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), knew about these purchases, and likely the deception, when he was head of Sharif University in the early 1990s.  In one case (see The Telexes: Whole Body Counters and the Physics Research Center), the express mail company DHL could not deliver two packages of important documents to Shahmoradi at Sharif University, and it was told to re-deliver them to the purchasing manager of Sharif University or Salehi.  According to another telex, Shahmoradi received from Sharif University the “full authority to make final decision at the whole purchasing stages (i.e. ordering, terms of payment and delivery, opening L/C [letters of credit], etc” (telex 171). This telex was signed “Sharif University of Technology.” Shahmoradi could conduct his smuggling operations with the full authority of the university. Salehi, as head of the university, must have granted that authority to Shahmoradi. He would be expected to be aware of Shahmoradi’s use of this authority and the intended purpose of the goods ordered by Sharif University and the PHRC. ISIS obtained a copy of a letter signed by Salehi as head of Sharif University in 1991 that served as an end user guarantee to a European supplier. This letter and the associated telexes demonstrate that he was personally aware of the PHRC purchases. The name of the supplier is being withheld because the company wants to maintain its confidentiality. In this letter, Salehi certified non-military use of purchased goods and assured the supplier that the goods would be used at the university for teaching and demonstration purposes or for research purposes by Sharif University students. The procurements associated with this letter were handled by Shahmoradi. Moreover, after the supplier was unable to obtain its payment from Bank Sepah’s branch in Frankfurt, the bank branch sent its questions to Shahmoradi at the PHRC telex number and not to Sharif University’s telex. This was likely because the actual purchaser was the PHRC. The PHRC and Sharif University also made or attempted several other procurements from this same company in 1990 and 1991, at least one of which had the distinctive order number that signifies department 2 a department within the PHRC that is associated with gas centrifuges.  In this case, the telexes were from Sharif University’s telex number and had no mention of the PHRC—demonstrating how procurements destined for a secret gas centrifuge effort would be procured via Sharif University. Moreover, one of these telexes (file number withheld to protect the company’s identity) stated that Sharif University had indicated or implied in a request for prices that the items were “components for nuclear research and uranium enrichment”. The company responded that it could not provide any quotations for these items for fear of violating export laws.  The telexes in this case do not name Salehi, but the procurement is done under the name of the institution he headed. Since he knew of other procurements to this company, it is reasonable to conclude that he knew about this one as well. Shahmoradi’s Smuggling Activities The report titled Iranian Smuggling for Military Nuclear Programs: From Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group to the Physics Research Center shows that the former head of the Physics Research Center, Shahmoradi, was involved in Iranian smuggling efforts in the 1980s when he was at the Iranian missile entity Shahid Hammat Industrial Group (SHIG). There, he is linked to procurement fronts or trading companies that aided Iranian procurements in Europe and the United States for equipment with centrifuge applications and chemical precursors for mustard gas. After Shahmoradi transitioned to the PHRC, he continued to use some of these fronts in PHRC’s purchasing efforts. Telexes reveal companies and telex names that were used by intermediaries to further procurements for the PHRC and its front Sharif University. The individuals involved in some of those efforts may have used or formed other companies that engaged in illicit procurements for this network or became involved in procuring illegally for other Iranian entities.  The report The Telexes: Whole Body Counters and the Physics Research Center provides new details of an on-going investigation into Iran’s procurement of U.S.-origin equipment that was traced in 2004 to the headquarters of the PHRC at Lavisan Shian in north Tehran. The information shows that Iran misled the U.S. supplier about the final end user of the equipment, which was stated to be Sharif University. The telexes show that the PHRC sought goods under the name of innocent sounding Iranian companies, some of which were only sanctioned by supplier countries many years later. The third report, Telexes: Front Company Kala Naft, discusses one of these companies.  The PHRC used the name of a known Iranian procurement company associated with the oil and gas industry to procure covertly for its nuclear program. This company Kala Naft was eventually sanctioned by Britain and Japan ten years later. Although Shahmoradi purchased many goods through Sharif University of Technology, he also made purchases in the name of at least one other university, Amir Kabir University, also known as Polytechnic University. The fourth report, Telexes: Amir Kabir University and Dr. Shahmoradi, is an assessment of a subset of telexes concerning an order of a mini-computer byAmir Kabir University. The report concludes that the PHRC was likely using this other Iranian university as a front to purchase goods for itself, in this case a U.S. origin mini-computer made by Digital Equipment Company. This sale may have violated U.S. re-export control laws. Final Note The telexes indicate that Iran for years has used intricate networks of smugglers aimed at outfitting its military nuclear efforts. In addition to settling serious concerns regarding the PHRC and its military nuclear activities, a long-term solution to the nuclear crisis needs to include a commitment by Iran not to procure illegally for its nuclear or missile programs. An ISIS discussion of the need for Iranian anti-proliferation commitments as part of a long term agreement can be found here. 2012-05-16T13:01:00+00:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/detail/iran-foreign-ministry-spokesperson-responds-to-evidence-of-new-activity-at-/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/iran-foreign-ministry-spokesperson-responds-to-evidence-of-new-activity-at-/#When:13:24:00Z Iran began to provide an explanation for the activity at the Parchin site seen in the new commercial satellite image by denying that it was associated with cleansing activities for removing nuclear contaminants.  Iran should state what these activities were.  Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ramin Mehmanparast stated that nuclear material contamination could not be washed away.  This is not true. The concern is that washing could be incorporated into an effort to cleanse the building.  The process could involve grinding down the surfaces inside the building, collecting the dust and then washing the area thoroughly.  This could be followed with new building materials and paint.  It could also involve removing any dirt around the building thought to contain contaminants. These types of activities could be effective in defeating environmental sampling.  Separately, the most significant aspect of the April 9, 2012 satellite image is that there is any activity at all taking place after the IAEA revealed in its November 2011 Safeguards report that it wants to visit this building.  2012-05-11T13:24:00+00:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/detail/media-matters-faulty-report-on-broadcast-media/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/media-matters-faulty-report-on-broadcast-media/#When:15:18:01Z Media Matters for America has published a misleading report on whether the broadcast news networks misrepresent intelligence on Iranian nuclear issues.  The methodology used in the report is flawed and highly biased. It is so defective that it appears designed to reach a pre-determined conclusion sought by Media Matters. Media Matters is using a methodology that results in false comparisons between debates over the nuclear programs of Iraq and Iran. (Its statement of its methodology is reprinted at the end of this report.) Overall, the media coverage of Iran’s nuclear program has been far better than the early 2000s coverage of whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Certainly, everyone should be careful and skeptical of claims of nuclear weapons efforts by any country. That is a central lesson of the Iraq WMD fiasco. Yet simplistic comparisons between Iraq and Iran do not serve the public interest but instead stifle important debate about the Iranian nuclear issue. Media Matters does not seem to challenge that Iran had a nuclear weapons program prior to 2004. They also seem to accept that Iran is technically capable of building a crude nuclear weapon in one year, as Secretary of Defense Panetta has stated. But they are misstating, or are unable to understand the technical situation, by claiming that any estimate of Iran being less than a year away from a nuclear weapon is misrepresenting the facts. Twelve months is ok but eleven is not. What about nine or ten months? If they used three or six months as a criteria, they would be more accurate according to assessments by governments and independent experts, as long as they made it clear they were discussing the current situation.  One year might be realistic now but it could take Iran a much shorter period of time to build a crude nuclear explosive in a few years if it continues developing its nuclear capabilities as planned. Media Matters also coded as misrepresenting the facts “segments that speculated on the consequences if Iran were to develop nuclear weapons.”  Speculation about what would happen if Iran restarted a nuclear weapons program is a key question of the day, and it is not a misrepresentation if it is mentioned in a media report.  The authors appear to accept that Iran had a bomb program before 2004. Nonetheless, this report glosses over the central concern that the international community has regarding Iran’s nuclear program: that there is considerable evidence that Iran had a military nuclear program at least until the early 2000s and possibly has continued some of those activities.  The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is also concerned that parts of this program continued after 2004. Should we just accept at face value without any verification the Supreme Leader’s denial of any nuclear weapons effort now, particularly since he also denies that any bomb program existed prior to 2004?  No country dedicated to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons can accept the Supreme Leader’s public statements about the peaceful intent of its nuclear program until Iran comes clean about past military nuclear programs and clears up questions about whether some parts continue.  The IAEA stands ready to do that. Media reporting on what may occur if Iran decides to build nuclear weapons is responsible reporting on a major concern of the United States public and the rest of the world. The Media Matters report seems not to recognize when the media is discussing past or possibly on-going nuclear weaponization work versus reporting on Iran’s current or future nuclear weapons capability. These are different issues that the broadcast media scrutinized by Media Matters has in fact worked hard to cover fairly. Media Matters’ decision to judge negatively a news report if Ahmadinejad is mentioned “in any capacity” is also highly distorting, since he certainly has an important voice as President of Iran and often weighs in on nuclear issues, guaranteeing that he will be quoted.  While it is true that President Ahmadinejad does not have the type of control over Iran’s nuclear ambitions as the Supreme Leader, Ahmadinejad routinely makes major announcements regarding Iran’s nuclear program and has expressed important policy goals for the program.  It is not reasonable to expect a news organization to leave out any mention of Iran’s president when reporting on its nuclear program and it is certainly not misleading or biased if a news organization does mention or quote him in a story on Iran’s nuclear program. In summary, Media Matters’ methodology leads to conclusions that are likely false and should be discounted.  The run-up to the Iraq war did indeed expose troubling shortcomings by the American media when it failed to more critically examine claims made by the Bush administration.  ISIS is all too familiar with the faulty evidence about nuclear weapons programs that the administration misused to generate public support for a war and worked hard to critique the information publicly long before the start of the war.  But the situation we are in now with Iran is very different than in the run-up to the Iraq war, and trying to portray the two as similar is inaccurate. Media Matters Methodology Excerpt from the Media Matters report on its methodology: “Media Matters reviewed Nexis transcripts between November 8, 2011 (the day that coverage picked up after the IAEA issued its report) and March 31, 2012 for segments on ABC’s World News, CBS’ Evening News, and NBC’s Nightly News about Iran and its nuclear program. All applicable segments were reviewed for discussion of weaponization and mentions of Ahmadinejad. Segments that assumed Iran had an active nuclear weapons program or stated that the country would obtain the bomb in less than a year were coded as misrepresenting the facts. Segments that speculated on the consequences if Iran were to develop nuclear weapons were also included because such speculation ignores that no evidence has surfaced to suggest that Iran intends to build nukes. Any segment that mentioned Ahmadinejad in any capacity was coded as unnecessarily connecting the Iranian president to the country’s nuclear program.”   2012-04-19T15:18:01+00:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/detail/no-obama-letter-to-iran/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/no-obama-letter-to-iran/#When:16:56:00Z On January 18, conservative Iranian lawmaker Ali Motahari announced and Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast confirmed that President Barack Obama had sent a letter to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei warning Iran against closing the Straits of Hormuz and requesting direct talks.  Mehmanparast said that Iran was considering an official response.  Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Committee deputy chairman Hojjatoleslam Hossein Ebrahimi also went on to describe the details of the letter at length.  U.S. officials meanwhile have denied the existence of such a letter, and ISIS has also learned from a European source who has proven reliable in the past that President Obama did not send the letter, which Iranian officials claim was passed through three different diplomatic channels.  ISIS is interested in confirming whether anyone has learned otherwise. It is interesting to speculate on the motive for such a rumor if it was started by Iran.  Perhaps some in the regime seek to start a national conversation about direct Iran-U.S. talks, or wanted to test the official U.S. reaction in the media to the notion of conducting direct talks amidst an atmosphere of growing tension.  In an even more convoluted theory, Iran may have sought to embarrass President Obama for seeking talks with Iran while he faces increased criticism over his Iran policy by hawkish U.S. lawmakers and presidential candidates.  On the other hand, rumors are sometimes only rumors with no clear intent. 2012-01-20T16:56:00+00:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/detail/irans-ridiculous-distraction/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/irans-ridiculous-distraction/#When:21:44:00Z Iran should answer the IAEA’s concerns instead of trying to prevent the public from receiving in a timely manner widely available information about its nuclear activities In prepared statements to the Board of Governors in Vienna today, Iran’s ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Ali Asghar Soltanieh criticized ISIS for posting on its website the latest report on safeguards implementation in Iran and the assessment that ISIS performs of the data contained in the report.  In the remarks, Soltanieh states, “It comes as no surprise that almost at the same that the DG [Director General] report is released, the ISIS website publishes the report as well as sort of fictitious calculations as its evaluation on the detailed information of the report.” By posting the IAEA safeguards reports on its website, which ISIS has done for several years, ISIS is responding to the public’s need to view this information collectively and in a timely manner.  We could hold back the reports, which we receive from numerous government and non-governmental sources. However, the international community and the broader media have a need to receive important information on issues relating to nuclear proliferation, and, in particular, information on cases in which there is an egregious lack of cooperation with the IAEA—something that the Iranian government has demonstrated for years.  This is not the first time that the Iranian government has sought to keep the public in the dark and prevent ISIS from sharing with the public the safeguards reports.  Iran complained to the IAEA in a June 9, 2011 letter that ISIS disseminates the report on its website on the same day that it is released to all IAEA member states. Rather than trying to suppress vital information, Iran should fully explain to the international community its work related to nuclear weaponization as detailed in the recent IAEA report instead of complaining about ISIS’s efforts to serve the public good. By coming clean on its past and possibly current efforts to build nuclear weapons, Iran could resolve most concerns about its nuclear activities. Afterward, solving outstanding issues about its gas centrifuge program would be straightforward, as Brazil and South Africa learned many years ago. ISIS uses data in IAEA safeguards reports to track the number of installed centrifuges at Iran’s enrichment facilities and their operation. These data have recently shown the deficiencies of the IR-1 centrifuge at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. Iran’s efforts to complain about this ISIS analysis showing the poor performance of the Fuel Enrichment Plant would be better spent reexamining the wisdom of a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment program, which nearly ten years after construction started at this facility and likely over a hundred million dollars of investment, will apparently never be capable of supporting a nuclear power program.  Iran’s civil enrichment program may manage only to fuel a research reactor in Tehran. By doing so, it may well achieve a world record of sorts, namely producing the most expensive research reactor fuel ever. Answering the concerns of the IAEA and the international community and receiving a foreign supply of low enriched uranium for its civil reactors and thereby avoiding continued sanctions also makes far more economical sense, unless of course Iran really intends to build nuclear weapons. 2011-11-18T21:44:00+00:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/detail/david-albright-on-abcs-this-week-with-christiane-amanpour/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/david-albright-on-abcs-this-week-with-christiane-amanpour/#When:16:01:00Z Watch David Albright discuss Iran’s nuclear program and the next steps to resolve the crisis on the Sunday edition of ABC’s This Week with Christiane Amanpour. View the full episode here (starts at 28min): here 2011-11-14T16:01:00+00:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/detail/iaea-release-report-on-iran-and-alleged-weaponization-efforts/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/iaea-release-report-on-iran-and-alleged-weaponization-efforts/#When:18:56:00Z The IAEA has released a highly anticipated safeguards report on Iran. In addition to regular inspections information on Iran’s nuclear enrichment program, the report also contains the exchanges, open issues and analysis regarding the ambiguities on whether Iran is currently or has in the past done research into the weaponization of nuclear materials and their possible means of delivery. You can read the full IAEA report: here Read the ISIS analysis of the IAEA report here: ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report: Part 1 2011-11-08T18:56:00+00:00