http://www.isisnucleariran.org/in-brief/ en avagyan@isis-online.org Copyright 2012 2012-01-20T17:56:00-05:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/detail/no-obama-letter-to-iran/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/no-obama-letter-to-iran/#When:16:56:00Z On January 18, conservative Iranian lawmaker Ali Motahari announced and Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast confirmed that President Barack Obama had sent a letter to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei warning Iran against closing the Straits of Hormuz and requesting direct talks.  Mehmanparast said that Iran was considering an official response.  Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Committee deputy chairman Hojjatoleslam Hossein Ebrahimi also went on to describe the details of the letter at length.  U.S. officials meanwhile have denied the existence of such a letter, and ISIS has also learned from a European source who has proven reliable in the past that President Obama did not send the letter, which Iranian officials claim was passed through three different diplomatic channels.  ISIS is interested in confirming whether anyone has learned otherwise. It is interesting to speculate on the motive for such a rumor if it was started by Iran.  Perhaps some in the regime seek to start a national conversation about direct Iran-U.S. talks, or wanted to test the official U.S. reaction in the media to the notion of conducting direct talks amidst an atmosphere of growing tension.  In an even more convoluted theory, Iran may have sought to embarrass President Obama for seeking talks with Iran while he faces increased criticism over his Iran policy by hawkish U.S. lawmakers and presidential candidates.  On the other hand, rumors are sometimes only rumors with no clear intent. 2012-01-20T16:56:00-05:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/detail/irans-ridiculous-distraction/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/irans-ridiculous-distraction/#When:21:44:00Z Iran should answer the IAEA’s concerns instead of trying to prevent the public from receiving in a timely manner widely available information about its nuclear activities In prepared statements to the Board of Governors in Vienna today, Iran’s ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Ali Asghar Soltanieh criticized ISIS for posting on its website the latest report on safeguards implementation in Iran and the assessment that ISIS performs of the data contained in the report.  In the remarks, Soltanieh states, “It comes as no surprise that almost at the same that the DG [Director General] report is released, the ISIS website publishes the report as well as sort of fictitious calculations as its evaluation on the detailed information of the report.” By posting the IAEA safeguards reports on its website, which ISIS has done for several years, ISIS is responding to the public’s need to view this information collectively and in a timely manner.  We could hold back the reports, which we receive from numerous government and non-governmental sources. However, the international community and the broader media have a need to receive important information on issues relating to nuclear proliferation, and, in particular, information on cases in which there is an egregious lack of cooperation with the IAEA—something that the Iranian government has demonstrated for years.  This is not the first time that the Iranian government has sought to keep the public in the dark and prevent ISIS from sharing with the public the safeguards reports.  Iran complained to the IAEA in a June 9, 2011 letter that ISIS disseminates the report on its website on the same day that it is released to all IAEA member states. Rather than trying to suppress vital information, Iran should fully explain to the international community its work related to nuclear weaponization as detailed in the recent IAEA report instead of complaining about ISIS’s efforts to serve the public good. By coming clean on its past and possibly current efforts to build nuclear weapons, Iran could resolve most concerns about its nuclear activities. Afterward, solving outstanding issues about its gas centrifuge program would be straightforward, as Brazil and South Africa learned many years ago. ISIS uses data in IAEA safeguards reports to track the number of installed centrifuges at Iran’s enrichment facilities and their operation. These data have recently shown the deficiencies of the IR-1 centrifuge at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. Iran’s efforts to complain about this ISIS analysis showing the poor performance of the Fuel Enrichment Plant would be better spent reexamining the wisdom of a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment program, which nearly ten years after construction started at this facility and likely over a hundred million dollars of investment, will apparently never be capable of supporting a nuclear power program.  Iran’s civil enrichment program may manage only to fuel a research reactor in Tehran. By doing so, it may well achieve a world record of sorts, namely producing the most expensive research reactor fuel ever. Answering the concerns of the IAEA and the international community and receiving a foreign supply of low enriched uranium for its civil reactors and thereby avoiding continued sanctions also makes far more economical sense, unless of course Iran really intends to build nuclear weapons. 2011-11-18T21:44:00-05:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/detail/david-albright-on-abcs-this-week-with-christiane-amanpour/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/david-albright-on-abcs-this-week-with-christiane-amanpour/#When:16:01:00Z Watch David Albright discuss Iran’s nuclear program and the next steps to resolve the crisis on the Sunday edition of ABC’s This Week with Christiane Amanpour. View the full episode here (starts at 28min): here 2011-11-14T16:01:00-05:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/detail/iaea-release-report-on-iran-and-alleged-weaponization-efforts/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/iaea-release-report-on-iran-and-alleged-weaponization-efforts/#When:18:56:00Z The IAEA has released a highly anticipated safeguards report on Iran. In addition to regular inspections information on Iran’s nuclear enrichment program, the report also contains the exchanges, open issues and analysis regarding the ambiguities on whether Iran is currently or has in the past done research into the weaponization of nuclear materials and their possible means of delivery. You can read the full IAEA report: here Read the ISIS analysis of the IAEA report here: ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report: Part 1 2011-11-08T18:56:00-05:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/detail/iran-nuclear-issue-considerations-for-a-negotiated-outcome/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/iran-nuclear-issue-considerations-for-a-negotiated-outcome/#When:15:14:01Z John Carlson, former Director General of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, has written a paper highlighting the key considerations for a negotiated outcome regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. Iran has been found in non-compliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement, and accordingly is in non-compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).1 Iran is continuing its uranium enrichment program and heavy water-related activities in defiance of Security Council resolutions calling for their suspension. The IAEA is trying to resolve a number of matters indicating a possible military dimension to Iran’s nuclear program, but Iran is not cooperating with the IAEA’s investigations. There are well-founded concerns that the Iranian enrichment and heavy water programs have a military objective – to give Iran the capability to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so. What is not clear is how far Iran intends to proceed down this path – will it cross the nuclear weapon threshold, or if not, how far short will it stop? Amongst other issues, this paper addresses the commonly held belief that Iran is entitled to undertake uranium enrichment, and the closely related question whether nuclear hedging – establishing a nuclear weapon break-out capability in the guise of a civilian program – is a legitimate activity under the NPT. If a negotiated solution with Iran is achieved that allows for continued enrichment, this must also adequately address international concerns that Iran’s nuclear program has a military purpose. A “solution” that allows continued development of a military dimension would be pointless. Read the full report by John Carlson at: Iran Nuclear Issue – Considerations for a Negotiated Outcome 2011-11-04T15:14:01-05:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/detail/debunking-gregory-jones-again/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/debunking-gregory-jones-again/#When:13:00:00Z by David Albright and Christina Walrond On October 18, Gregory Jones published a response to ISIS’s September 20 critique of his study on breakout timelines at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) in Iran. Jones maintains that Iran could fabricate 20 kg of weapon-grade uranium (WGU)—enough for one nuclear weapon—in two months in a breakout scenario at Natanz, while ISIS estimates that such a scenario would take at least six months.  Unfortunately, his conclusions are founded on an unreliable method. As a result, his estimate dramatically understates the amount of time Iran would need to produce 20 kg of WGU at the FEP. In emails with one of us, Jones made clear that his calculations rely entirely on a separative work calculator, such as the one found at www.wise-uranium.org, to determine the enriched uranium output of a centrifuge plant. A separative work calculator is a useful, but very basic, means of estimating enriched uranium output and the correlating timeframes. Despite its inordinate length, his new response included neither a detailed calculation to justify his controversial result nor a compelling explanation for his use of a separative work calculator to estimate WGU production at the FEP. He fails to address ISIS’s critique that this method results in unreliable estimates when it is applied to this plant. Jones attempts in this response to justify his application of a separative work calculation at the FEP almost entirely by citing an article published in 2008 by Alexander Glaser. In his response, Jones goes further and claims that his calculations are “an adaptation of calculations by Glaser.” In reality, Jones merely used a separative work calculator and later attempted to justify his choice by citing Glaser. He has not performed any detailed calculations as Glaser and ISIS have done. But Jones’s analysis has a bigger problem. Jones’s justification depends on calculations made by Glaser that are not applicable to the estimation of the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) at the FEP. Moreover, Glaser is aware of this problem. In our initial critique, we did not address Jones’s cavalier dismissal of information and data that contradicts his conclusions but that he did not access. In his August 9, 2011 paper, he does not appear to be aware of ISIS’s newer calculations about breakout times at the FEP.  Nonetheless, he must have been aware of U.S. government estimates, widely cited in the media about a year ago, that breakout at Natanz would require about a year. Here is what he writes about such estimates: “Other estimates of when Iran might be able to produce the HEU required for nuclear weapons are often given as flat statements with no supporting analysis.  This is especially so for the estimates given by various U.S. government officials.  In many cases these estimates appear to be merely wishful thinking.  As I have written elsewhere, the distinguished intelligence analyst Roberta Wohlstetter noted a phenomenon where analysts when faced with an unpleasant reality instead engage in self-deception by constructing a more pleasant fiction that allows the analysts to avoid facing up to the more unpleasant reality.” Jones does not appear to have attempted to understand the reasoning behind the U.S. estimate, merely dismissing it as politicized intelligence.  However, had he learned the basis of the U.S. estimate—and U.S. officials relatively freely talked to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) about this estimate made by the Department of Energy—he would have learned why his estimate is therefore viewed as so extreme. He also could have learned that, at that time, Israel assessed that breakout at the FEP would take less than a year but more than six months. ISIS Estimates Over a year ago, ISIS estimated that breakout at the FEP would take approximately six months, before the additional problems that Iran experienced over the past year at the FEP materialized. Naturally, the continued high rates of breakage, the decreasing enrichment levels attained at the FEP, and the decreasing average low-enriched uranium (LEU) output per IR-1 centrifuge over the past year only further complicate Iran’s ability to make WGU at the FEP. Therefore, ISIS does not believe that Iran is currently capable of shortening this breakout time at the FEP.  It is true, as Jones points out, that ISIS used separative work calculations in the March 3, 2010 ISIS study Supplement to Iran’s Gas Centrifuge Program: Taking Stock.  However, for this study, ISIS used this method as a way to perform a worst-case assessment, namely an estimate of the least amount of time possible for Iran to breakout at the FEP.  ISIS did not estimate the likely time in which a breakout would occur. Jones and the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) have misinterpreted our method and mistakenly implied that our estimate roughly matches theirs.  1 When ISIS uses separative work calculators, they comprise only one part of a larger analysis that involves cascade design, plant performance, breakage rates, and other elements specific to the Natanz FEP and the IR-1 centrifuge design. Over a year and a half ago, ISIS decided to further modify its approach, taking into account a number of real-life problems experienced in FEP centrifuge cascade operation.  Since then, ISIS has applied more sophisticated calculations by a well-known centrifuge expert who uses a fixed plant production model in the case of FEP breakout.  Our critique of Jones’s approach is derived from these improved, more realistic assessments and our extensive experience estimating breakout times at the FEP. 1. Jones claims that there are mistakes in the March 3, 2010 ISIS study Supplement to Iran’s Gas Centrifuge Program: Taking Stock.  However, what he points out in the study are not errors. Jones evidently does not realize that our estimates have different units, namely we use uranium hexafluoride mass, not just uranium mass, which is the unit he uses. He assumed we must have used the same unit as he did.  Compounding his error, he misinterprets “several months” in the March 2010 study as “1.5 to 3.5 months,” where he uses the wrong conversion factor to go from total weapon-grade uranium to the number of weapons and time to produce a weapon.  He uses a conversion factor that is for uranium mass only. Admittedly, the units have been confusing in this debate, with uranium hexafluoride mass often confused with uranium mass. At ISIS, we have sometimes been guilty of not specifying which units we are using, and the March 3, 2010 paper is one of those cases. As a result, we have since instituted a policy to clearly state the units. However, the inability of Jones to recognize the alternative unit, which is typically listed along with the result in uranium mass in popular separative work calculators, is just another reason why we recommend that groups such as the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, seek additional review of Jones’s work before they publish it. 2011-10-27T13:00:00-05:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/detail/performance-of-the-ir-1-centrifuge-at-natanz/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/performance-of-the-ir-1-centrifuge-at-natanz/#When:23:57:00Z Although the average monthly production of 3.5 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) has increased to about 150 kg/month, the number of centrifuges needed to produce this LEU has increased disproportionately compared to the previous year. During the last year, Iran has needed 5,860 IR-1 centrifuges to produce this amount of LEU. In the previous year, it would have needed only about 4,820 IR-1 centrifuges to make this quantity of LEU. View the full report here: http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/IR1_Centrifuge_Performance_18October2011.pdf 2011-10-18T23:57:00-05:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/detail/irans-advanced-centrifuges/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/irans-advanced-centrifuges/#When:00:02:00Z Last summer, Iran began installing two cascades of advanced centrifuges at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz. As of August 28, 2011, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran had installed 136 IR-2m centrifuges in cascade 5 and 27 IR-4 centrifuges in cascade 4. Iran started feeding 54 of the 136 IR-2m centrifuges with natural uranium hexafluoride. 1 Each of these cascades is designed to contain 164 centrifuges. Iran first told the IAEA in January 2011 that it intended to install these two cascades, and it is unclear why Iran waited nearly eight months before starting to install them. Installation of the IR-2m centrifuges is now complete. Installation of the IR-4 centrifuges could finish anytime. The purpose of operating these cascades at the PFEP is to demonstrate their performance prior to installation of production cascades at the Natanz plant, the Fordow facility, or possibly a third enrichment site that may currently be under construction. Iran should be able to finish this demonstration work at the pilot plant within six to nine months, and perhaps sooner. View the full report here: http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/Iran_Advanced_Centrifuges_18October2011.pdf 2011-10-18T00:02:00-05:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/detail/new-satellite-imagery-of-iranian-nuclear-sites-on-google-earth/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/new-satellite-imagery-of-iranian-nuclear-sites-on-google-earth/#When:12:41:00Z Over the last several months, Google Earth has posted updated commercial satellite imagery over Iran which includes several nuclear sites such as the Arak heavy water reactor and heavy water production site, the Ardakan yellowcake production plant and the Gchine uranium mine and mill. View the full report with new images here: http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/New_Satellite_Imagery_of_Iranian_Nuclear_Sites_on_Google_Earth_11October2011.pdf 2011-10-11T12:41:00-05:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/detail/ahmadinejad-reiterates-willingness-to-halt-20-percent-enrichment/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/brief/ahmadinejad-reiterates-willingness-to-halt-20-percent-enrichment/#When:18:48:00Z In a September 21 interview with The New York Times’ Nicholas Kristof, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad again reiterated Iran’s willingness to halt domestic 20 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) production in return for foreign supply of the material.  He said, “If they give us the 20% enriched uranium this very week, we will cease the domestic enrichment of uranium of up to 20 percent this very week.” Ahmadinejad previously stated Iran’s interest in such an arrangement to The Washington Post’s Lally Weymouth on September 13.  He indicated that Iran would still seek to produce 3.5 percent LEU. ISIS assesses that the United States and other P5+1 negotiating partners would be wise to pursue this offer and that an agreement that would cap 20 percent LEU production and institute a sales agreement for foreign supply of the fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) would be a positive measure.  Iran has no immediate or logical need for such large stockpiles of this material and its continued production only fuels concern that its enrichment program is oriented toward achieving a nuclear weapons breakout capability.  To test out Ahmadinejad’s offer, the United States could suggest that it would arrange the sale of two-year’s worth of TRR fuel in exchange for a two-year halt to any production of uranium enriched over five percent.  TRR targets for medical isotope production could also be offered for sale to increase interest in the deal.  Such an agreement would be modest.  It would not substitute for an agreement solving the fundamental nuclear issues and should not include any reductions in sanctions on Iran, or for that matter slow down current efforts to increase both the level of sanctions and their effectiveness. It remains, as of yet, unclear whether Ahmadinejad has coordinated his announcements with other parts of the Iranian nuclear establishment, namely Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani or Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.  In his interview to Kristof, Ahmadinejad appeared surprised that Abbasi-Davani had earlier ruled out any halt to 20 percent enrichment in favor of importing the fuel, in contradiction to his offers.  Kristof asked: “Mr. Abbasi-Davani, the head of the Iranian nuclear program, was quoted as saying that [such an arrangement] was no longer a possibility.” Ahmadinejad replied: “Who did you hear that from sir?” and indicated that Abbasi-Davani was perhaps just disappointed with the West’s failure to follow through on a sales agreement.  Ahmadinejad also failed to win internal consensus on a 2009 proposal for Iran to swap out its 20 percent LEU for foreign fabrication of the material into reactor fuel.  Thus, questions remain whether Ahmadinejad could deliver any agreement. Nonetheless, the United States would do well to follow up on his offer with a “sales and cap” proposal.  Despite the limited nature of such an agreement, capping even temporarily Iran’s stock of 20 percent LEU would reduce concern that Iran is producing weapon-grade uranium piecemeal.  This agreement would also provide humanitarian assistance by increasing Iran’s supply of medical isotopes.  2011-09-22T18:48:00-05:00