The IAEA has been applying safeguards in Iran since the mid-1970s, shortly after Iran concluded its first Safeguards Agreement with the Agency in May 1974. General information about IAEA safeguards can be found here.
On June 6, 2003, the IAEA released the first in what have become a series of regular reports on Iran's nuclear program, specifically the status of its safeguards implementation. These reports are rich in detail about Iran's activities and, taken as a whole, provide the single most authoritative set of documents about Iran's nuclear activities. The following cursory annotation of the reports should not be read as an exhaustive summary of each report's contents, but as an abbreviated roadmap to a few key highlights.
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran for February 19, 2015
IAEA's latest update on Iran's compliance with the JPOA
Status of Iran’s Nuclear Program in relation to the Joint Plan of Action, November 24, 2014
Latest IAEA safeguards report on Iran
This IAEA safeguards report on Iran contains the first set of inspections information on the Qom underground uranium enrichment plant revealed in late September 2009.
The IAEA has released its long awaited August 2009 Safeguards report on Iran with details regarding the rumored halt in the increase of the number of new centrifuges at Natanz.
The IAEA has released its latest safeguards report on Iran's nuclear program.
The IAEA has released its November report detailing the status of implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803 in Iran.
Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of UNSC 1737 and 1747 in Iran.
Briefing notes from February 2008 IAEA meeting regarding Iran’s nuclear program.
NuclearIran highlights: very detailed report, covers most “outstanding issues” including Iran’s explanation of procurement by Physics Research center, the uranium metal document, Polonium-210 research, contamination issues, the role of the Gchine mine, some discussion of “alleged studies” on weaponization. Notes that since February 2007, 1670kg of UF6 has been introduced into the cascades with 75kg of product with a stated enrichment of 3.8 percent U235. Mentions work on four different centrifuge designs and installation of IR-2 test cascades.
: Good review of Iran's acquisition of fuel cycle technology between 1972 and 1995; concludes that Iran's explanation of its 1987 and 1993 dealings with the Khan network (referred to as a "supply network") is "consistent with other information available to the Agency." Interesting discussion of procurement efforts for P-2 centrifuge in para 22 (note in subsequent reports P-2 is known as the IR-2). UF6 feed totals 1240 kg since February 2007; 18 cascades running.
: Relatively short report, but does include the text of the so-called Workplan
agreement, outlining a timetable for the resolution of a series of outstanding issues between Iran and the IAEA. ISIS issued a report critical of this plan here. Notes that Iran has introduced 690kg of UF6 into the cascades at the Fuel Enrichment plant since February 2007 with 12 cascades operating
and three others under various stages of installation.
: Reports that Iran suspended the "implementation of modified Code 3.1
" effectively reverting to a 1976 version of the code under which Iran is obligated to inform Iran of new facilities only 180 days prior to the introduction of nuclear material. Notes that 260 kg of UF6 have been fed into a total of eight
cascades; five additional cascades were under construction.
: Relatively brief report; reports Iran's intentions to begin feeding UF6 into the cascades
installed at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment by the end of February 2007. 66kg total fed into centrifuges at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment plant. IAEA notes desire for remote monitoring at FEP.
NuclearIran highlights: This is not a traditional safeguards report
. UN Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) requires that the IAEA suspend or limit certain technical cooperation with Iran. This report details those programs that the IAEA felt should continue in light of the resolution (related primarily to nuclear medicine or nuclear safety for example) and those that it recommended suspending (programs related to the management or operation of nuclear power facilities).
This is one of the most detailed IAEA reports in terms of providing comprehensive background and information about the history of Iran's nuclear program, in particular procurement and R&D for its centrifuge program. It also addresses other areas of the fuel cycle in some detail. A good report to read and reference in conjunction with later reports.
This is not a formal IAEA report, but the IAEA's response to a Note Verbale submitted by Iran taking issue with parts of the November 2003 report