NuclearIran News
Technicalities and the Fordow Enrichment Plant
November 30, 2009
An analysis published November 24 in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists by Ivan Oelrich and Ivanka Barzashka, “A Technical Evaluation of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant” concludes that the Fordow enrichment facility is “neither ideal for commercial nor for military purposes.” Oelrich and Barzashka argue that not only is the facility ill-suited for the production of reactor fuel, it is also too small for enriching uranium for weapons. This latter argument appears to rest primarily on an assertion that 3,000 IR-1 centrifuges would need roughly one year to produce enough weapons-grade uranium using low enriched uranium as feed, or four years to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one bomb starting with natural uranium. The authors provide no further explanation or technical justification in the article for their estimates. Nonetheless, these estimates of time, however, are far too long, under a range of reasonable assumptions about future operation of IR-1 and more advanced centrifuges at the Fordow site.
ISIS’s assessment is that using 3,000 IR-1 centrifuges, and starting with natural uranium, Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one bomb in roughly one year. With the use of low enriched uranium, the facility could make weapons-grade uranium significantly faster. This one-year estimate is similar to what the U.S. government estimated when it revealed the Fordow site on September 25, 2009.
See the report for the full technical analysis: Critique of Recent Bulletin of Atomic Scientists article on the Fordow Enrichment Plant
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