http://www.isisnucleariran.org/news/ en avagyan@isis-online.org Copyright 2010 2010-09-01T14:21:00-05:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/news/detail/salehi-claims-38-kg-monthly-production-rate-of-1975-percent-enriched-uraniu/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/news/salehi-claims-38-kg-monthly-production-rate-of-1975-percent-enriched-uraniu/#When:13:21:00Z On August 27, 2010, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI) and Vice President of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, said that the country had produced 25 kilograms of 19.75 percent enriched uranium at Natanz since it began enriching uranium up to this level in February 2010.  The implied rate of 19.75% uranium production is consistent with the rate suggested by Salehi on June 23rd—about 3.8kg per month—when he claimed that Iran had produced 17 kg of 19.75% enriched uranium since February.  However, based on data included in the IAEA’s May safeguards report on Iran, ISIS estimated that Iran would have produced approximately 13.4 kg by the same date, at a lower rate of approximately 3 kg per month. As ISIS noted, Salehi could be extrapolating total amounts from estimated rates of production instead of from actual measurements.  The 25 kg total that Salehi gave on August 27 is almost exactly what the projected total would be from the original 3.8 kg rate suggested by the 17 kg stated total in June.  Though this may simply be the result of a consistent production rate, it is also possible that Salehi is announcing an extrapolated total production of 19.75% uranium at various stages based on an initial production rate estimate.  It is also possible that Iran started off with a lower production rate and then a later, higher production rate resulted in the higher totals that Salehi has announced.  The IAEA report on Iran that is set for release this Friday or Monday may further clarify Iran’s monthly production rate of 19.75% enriched uranium.  2010-09-01T13:21:00-05:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/news/detail/technical-note-iran-recycles-the-tails-in-the-production-of-1975-percent-ur/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/news/technical-note-iran-recycles-the-tails-in-the-production-of-1975-percent-ur/#When:13:24:00Z ISIS has learned that Iran is now using the second cascade at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz to recycle the tails from the first cascade that produces 19.75 percent enriched uranium from 3.5 percent low enriched uranium (LEU).  The purpose is not to increase the output of 19.75 percent material but to maximize the use of the 3.5 percent low enriched uranium (LEU).  ISIS previously reported that Iran had stated its intention to recycle tails at the PFEP during the production of 19.75 percent uranium.  The two percent enriched tails from the first cascade is fed into the feed point of the second cascade and emerges as about 10 percent enriched uranium.  This material is then fed into an upper stage of the first cascade, while the 3.5 percent uranium is fed in at the main feed point of this cascade.  With two feed points, the total amount of 19.75 percent product is not increased, but the enrichment effort embodied in the 2 percent material is more fully utilized.  The assay of the tails in the second cascade is 0.7 percent enriched uranium, or natural uranium.  This material can then be reused in cascades at the main Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz that make 3.5 percent uranium.  Recycling in the second cascade allows Iran to cut down on wasting separative work units (swu) in the enrichment process and ultimately requires less 3.5 percent LEU to produce a given quantity of 19.75 percent material.  Iran is not short on a supply of 3.5 percent material to make research reactor fuel and will not be anytime soon.  Thus, it hardly has to worry about using its tails efficiently.  If Iran enriches to weapon-grade uranium, however, it is expected to use the same type of procedure to reduce the amount of separative work left in the tails as it stepwise increases the enrichment level of the uranium, reducing the amount of feed material it needs at each step.  Iran likely received the same plans that the Khan network gave Libya detailing how to organize and run cascades to produce weapon-grade uranium from natural uranium in four steps, including recycling the tails produced in the top three steps (the first step goes from natural uranium to 3.5 percent LEU and produces about 0.4 percent tails).  Thus, Iran’s current actions, while superficially justified on civil grounds, mainly make sense in the context of learning how to make significant quantities of highly enriched uranium efficiently. 2010-08-06T13:24:00-05:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/news/detail/pressure-building-on-iran/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/news/pressure-building-on-iran/#When:14:56:00Z In recent weeks, Iran has been faced with a new round of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions, unilateral United States, European Union, Canadian, and Australian sanctions, and a resulting decreased ability to import gasoline, industrial, and consumer goods due to refusal by insurers to indemnify Iranian vessels and ships heading to Iran.  Is the squeeze finally on Iran, and if so, what impact could this have on the regime’s decision-making calculus with regard to its nuclear program? The series of new sanctions has arguably placed more pressure than ever before on Iran’s trading activities.  In June, the UNSC passed its fourth round of sanctions aimed at compelling Iran to comply with previous resolutions and resolve questions about the peaceful nature of its nuclear program.  The UN sanctions tightened restrictions on Iran’s shipping and financial activities and sanctioned members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).  The U.S. sanctions, passed in July, broaden UN sanctions by threatening penalties against foreign businesses that supply Iran with gasoline and refined petroleum products.  This week, the EU announced sanctions that will restrict sales of equipment used for oil refining and gasoline production.  They also more tightly limit financial transactions, prevent EU companies and insurers from doing business with Iranian government-affiliated entities, and rein in sales of nuclear and dual-use items to impact the supply line to Iran’s nuclear program.  (Iran does not have the capability to indigenously manufacture much of the equipment it requires to run both its oil and gas sector and its expanding gas centrifuge uranium enrichment program, despite its assertions that the latter is self-sufficient).  The European Union is still calculating the expected losses from the new restrictions, but as Iran’s largest trading partner, the decline in trade could be significant.  Finally, Canada and Australia announced restrictions on investments and business transactions with Iran’s oil and gas sector, along with tighter constraints on sales of nuclear, missile, and dual-use goods.  In addition, major insurers such as Lloyd’s and an unidentified Dutch insurer have announced that they will stop underwriting petroleum related shipments to Iran in favor of continued business with the United States, and other insurers are expected to follow suit.  This would make companies shipping fuel or other goods to Iran without insurance responsible for maritime accidents.  Iran’s annual import of 40 percent of its refined gasoline needs may become more expensive, and shortages could occur with a lack of regular shipments.  It remains unclear whether shortages of gasoline, industrial and specialized equipment, and other consumer goods will provoke popular discontent.  Suppliers in China and other countries may fill that void in short order, although pressure not to do so should be exerted on these countries by the United States.  The new sanctions are designed to put greater political pressure on Iran to change its nuclear policy. The main goal is to get Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program and to engage in a discussion on how to resolve outstanding questions with the International Atomic Energy Agency, increase transparency, and build assurances that Iran will not develop nuclear weapons.  These sanctions should be soundly implemented, given adequate time to work and, if necessary, strengthened.  Sanctions can also help hinder progress on Iran’s enrichment work by cutting off crucial supplies, which provides more time for negotiations.  A short-term goal is to swap Iran’s 20 percent enriched material for reactor fuel from abroad and achieve an end to any further production of 20 percent material. (Some reports have speculated that Iran’s recent move to re-start negotiations to exchange its uranium is a sign that it is already feeling the pressure from sanctions).  Iran yesterday indicated that halting further enrichment up to 20 percent is on the table. 2010-07-29T14:56:00-05:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/news/detail/has-iran-initiated-a-slow-motion-breakout-to-a-nuclear-weapon/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/news/has-iran-initiated-a-slow-motion-breakout-to-a-nuclear-weapon/#When:18:52:00Z by David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Andrea Stricker Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, announced today that Iran intends on producing 120 kilograms of 19.75 percent uranium by September 2011, purportedly for use in the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).  Salehi also announced that Iran is working on producing fuel plates.  This announcement raises concern that Iran is conducting a “slow motion breakout,” and that it could seek to make larger quantities of 19.75 percent enriched uranium as a way of bringing it closer to producing weapon-grade uranium for nuclear weapons.  Last month, ISIS released a report examining Iran’s production of 19.75 percent uranium and estimated that Iran would need between 125 kilograms and 210 kilograms of 19.75 percent uranium feedstock to further enrich up to weapon-grade in sufficient quantity for one nuclear weapon.  The range reflects the amount of weapon-grade uranium needed in a nuclear weapon.  The estimate assumed that the final tails assay would be 0.7 percent, or the level of natural uranium, based on Iran’s statements about taking the tails enriched to 2 percent from the cascade producing 19.75 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) and feeding them into a second cascade, where the final tails assay of this second cascade would be 0.7 percent.  ISIS further estimated that it would take at least 2.5 years to make 125 kilograms of 19.75 percent uranium using one cascade at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), and between 1.25 and 2.5 years using two cascades.  Iran may need to use more than one cascade to meet its goal of 120 kilograms of 19.75 percent LEU by September 2011. Although Iran states that it intends to use the 19.75 percent LEU in the production of TRR fuel elements, if Iran stockpiles this amount of 19.75 percent enriched uranium, it could have nearly the amount needed to produce subsequently enough weapon-grade uranium for a bomb.  Once it has enough 19.75 percent LEU, it is 90 percent of the way to weapon-grade uranium, meaning Iran could go from 19.75 percent to 90 percent in as little as one-tenth the time needed to go from natural uranium to weapon-grade uranium. Iran could continue producing more 19.75 percent LEU once it reaches that initial September 2011 target of 120 kilograms.  Iran could also cite this goal as the basis for enriching up to 19.75 percent in an increasing number of cascades and eventually surpass its target quantity. Reducing Feed Requirements in a Breakout Based on its own statements, Iran appears to be implementing a way to more efficiently use the tails and reduce the amount of 3.5 percent LEU feed it requires.  Instead of storing the 2 percent enriched tails, it has stated it will further enrich them in a second cascade, in a recycling process.  The final tails would be 0.7 percent and reusable in the cascades that make 3.5 percent LEU.  Iran did not state the enrichment level of the product of this second cascade, but it may be only 3.5 percent, meaning it would feed the 2 percent LEU into the upper stages of the second cascade.  Iran could then feed this 3.5 percent LEU into the first cascade to make more 19.75 percent LEU and start the whole process again.  By doing so, Iran could significantly reduce the amount of 3.5 percent LEU feed needed to make 19.75 percent material.  Such recycling would be particularly useful to a state attempting breakout with limited amounts of enriched uranium.  For example, without recycling, Iran might need about 2,000 kilograms of 3.5 percent LEU to produce 25 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium, where weapon-grade is achieved in three steps.  But by simultaneously enriching the tails in other cascades (and reducing the tails in those parallel cascades), Iran could reduce by half the amount of 3.5 percent LEU it would need to produce 25 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium.  Although this recycling would require Iran to dedicate more centrifuge cascades to a breakout, it would allow for a smaller initial stock of 3.5 percent enriched LEU. Conclusion The United Nations Security Council has called on Iran to suspend its enrichment program, and Salehi’s announcement further confirms the necessity of achieving this goal.  As a step to a suspension and a way to build confidence in negotiations, the LEU fuel swap deal remains important. Salehi claims in today’s statement that Iran is “now producing fuel plates.” This is likely an exaggeration of Iran’s capabilities.  Today’s statement demonstrates that Iran continues to make increasing amounts of 19.75 percent enriched uranium, but it still likely lacks the ability to manufacture fuel for the TRR.  This paradox indicates that there is still time for an LEU fuel swap deal, where Iran halts further production of 19.75 percent LEU and sends this material out of the country with 3.5 percent LEU.  This deal would be in Iran’s interest if it intends on fueling the TRR in September of next year.  2010-07-12T18:52:00-05:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/news/detail/salehi-says-sanctions-may-slow-irans-nuclear-program-lacks-enrichment-progr/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/news/salehi-says-sanctions-may-slow-irans-nuclear-program-lacks-enrichment-progr/#When:16:04:00Z In a somewhat surprising detour from the official line, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, said today that United Nations sanctions could slow Iran’s nuclear program, and in particular, the enrichment program.  Salehi said he expected no problems at the Bushehr reactor site, which Russia is building for Iran and plans to open in September.  However, he said, “…On the issue of enrichment, we may face problems with some equipment such as measuring instruments,” and indicated Iran would manufacture them if necessary.  This startling admission about Iran’s shortage of measuring equipment for the enrichment program comes one day after a Canadian court convicted a man who was working for Iran to obtain pressure transducers, equipment with applications in measuring the gas pressure inside centrifuge cascades.  Iran has reportedly sought this equipment worldwide in recent months, approaching companies located in the United States, Canada, Europe, China, and Taiwan.  Most requests have been denied due to UN sanctions.  Yet, given Salehi’s admission about a shortage, companies around the world which sell pressure transducers and other measuring devices relevant to uranium enrichment should remain especially vigilant about new and more deceptive Iranian attempts to procure them.  2010-07-07T16:04:00-05:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/news/detail/uae-cracks-down-on-irans-illicit-trade/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/news/uae-cracks-down-on-irans-illicit-trade/#When:13:47:00Z On June 21, a United Arab Emirates (UAE) newspaper, Gulf News Daily, quoted an anonymous government official as saying the UAE had closed down some 40 local and international companies associated with illicit trade to Iran over the past two years.  The official said that these companies traded in “dual-use and dangerous materials banned under UN resolutions and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.” The official also said that any companies associated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or its affiliates would be shut down, reiterating the country’s support for a recent UN resolution targeting, among other things, the military and dual-use procurement operations of the IRGC.  The UAE has reportedly canceled work permits for Iranians suspected of illicit trading activities, and over the last few months, has also stopped over thirty suspicious shipments of cargo heading to Iran.  (Notably, on June 22, the Islamic Republic News Agency reported on a walk out of Iranian officials during an inter-parliamentary meeting with UAE officials in Dubai.  The exact reason for the walk out was not specified, but the UAE’s announcement was alluded to by Iranian officials).  On June 22, Agence France Presse quoted a “Western diplomat” who said that U.S. pressure had succeeded in convincing the federal government based in Abu Dhabi to ramp up its efforts to crack down on Iran’s illicit trade, prompting this announcement.  Similar U.S. pressure was reportedly responsible for convincing the UAE to implement its first export controls in 2007.  Another UAE official quoted by The Financial Times said the UAE has even taken measures that “go beyond the sanctions regime.” This positive UAE announcement indicates that the United States has considerable diplomatic influence at its disposal to convince additional allies to clamp down on Iran’s illicit trading activities in military and dual-use equipment.  It should continue these efforts with other governments.  2010-06-25T13:47:00-05:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/news/detail/irans-lack-of-experience-in-making-trr-fuel-elements-leaves-room-for-leu-fu/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/news/irans-lack-of-experience-in-making-trr-fuel-elements-leaves-room-for-leu-fu/#When:12:22:00Z The head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Ali Akbar Salehi, announced yesterday that Iran had produced 17 kg of 19.75 percent enriched uranium at Natanz.  He said that the fuel will be used to operate the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).  Iran’s inexperience in making fuel elements for the TRR raises questions about its claims that it needs to continue enriching up to 19.75 percent, especially given how soon Iran says it intends to produce fuel elements for the reactor.  It also leaves open an opportunity to negotiate a Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) swap deal. In February 2010, Iran announced that President Ahmadinejad had instructed the AEOI to “start production of 20 percent enriched uranium.” Iran said that it was justified in enriching a portion of its stock of 5 percent uranium to 20 percent because it needed to make new fuel for the TRR for the production of medical isotopes.  The TRR is set to run out of fuel within the next few years.  Yet, Iran has still not learned to make research reactor fuel for the TRR.  Salehi said in June 2010 that the production of experimental fuel elements is slated for completion in March 2011, and Iran hopes to produce the TRR’s first batch of fuel elements by September 2011. This paradox indicates that there is still time for a Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel swap deal, which would be in Iran’s interest if it intends on fueling the TRR soon. 2010-06-24T12:22:00-05:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/news/detail/salehi-claims-iran-has-17kg-of-1975-enriched-uranium/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/news/salehi-claims-iran-has-17kg-of-1975-enriched-uranium/#When:15:40:00Z Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, announced that Iran has produced 17 kilograms (kg) of 19.75 percent enriched uranium at Natanz.  Based on the May 31 IAEA Safeguards Report, ISIS calculated that Iran had produced a total of approximately 11 kg of 19.75 percent uranium by the end of May, with an average rate of about 3 kg per month.  This same monthly estimate would have resulted in approximately 13.4 kg of 19.75 percent uranium produced by June 23, the date of Salehi’s comments, instead of 17 kg.  If the total of 17kg is accurate, the new monthly rate of production would be approximately 3.8 kg, instead of 3.  Again, if the 17 kg total is accurate, the initial estimate of approximately 3 kg per month at the end of May would be too low, as the additional kilograms of 19.75 percent uranium would have required a higher monthly rate of production since enrichment began in February.  It is also possible that the 17 kg reflects an overestimation by Iran of its daily or monthly production rate. 2010-06-23T15:40:00-05:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/news/detail/new-der-spiegel-article-on-irans-nuclear-program/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/news/new-der-spiegel-article-on-irans-nuclear-program/#When:12:37:00Z Erich Follath and Holger Stark of Der Spiegel Magazine have published an excellent, comprehensive articleon the history of Iran’s nuclear program.  The article discusses an important advocate of Iranian nuclear weapons, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, described as the “Robert Oppenheimer of Iran.” It reveals new information regarding intercepted Iranian documents involving Fakhrizadeh in 2003 where he and other scientists voiced their frustration after their program funds had been cut.  These communications may have underpinned the main conclusions in the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, which judged that Iran’s nuclear weapons program was halted in 2003. Read the full article on the Der Spiegel website here. 2010-06-21T12:37:00-05:00 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/news/detail/irans-reactor-claims-a-pretext-for-more-20-percent-enriched-uranium/ http://www.isisnucleariran.org/news/irans-reactor-claims-a-pretext-for-more-20-percent-enriched-uranium/#When:14:38:01Z Iran’s announcement this week that it wants to build four new nuclear research reactors should be viewed skeptically.  Such announcements can shroud other intentions, in this case an attempt by Iran to lay the basis for continued or even increased enrichment of 20 percent enriched uranium at the Natanz centrifuge plant. On June 16, Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization announced that Iran would begin work on four new research reactors for the production of medical isotopes.  The reactors’ planned locations were not announced, but Salehi stated that they would be constructed in different parts of the country to serve medical centers.  According to Salehi, the first reactor would replace the aging 5-megawatt Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), which has an estimated life span of fifteen more years.  He said the new reactor would be more powerful, operating at 20 megawatts-thermal, and that design work would start immediately and the reactor would start in five years.  Given that Iran has not built a reactor, and the Arak heavy water reactor construction project is delayed, this schedule is highly optimistic.  This plan also raises questions about Iran’s ability to meet minimal safety and environmental concerns about a new reactor and its fuel.  Iran has still not learned to make research reactor fuel for the TRR.  Salehi said the production of experimental fuel elements is slated for completion in March 2011.  Iran hopes to produce the TRR’s first batch of fuel elements by September 2011.  Given the unrealistic nature of Iran’s announcement, the question is whether it is a pretext for a claim that it must continue producing 20 percent enrichment to fuel these new research reactors.  Iran could also use its latest announcement as justification for employing additional cascades for the production of 20 percent enriched uranium at Natanz, thereby further entrenching its enrichment capability by creating additional “facts on the ground” and exacerbating tensions with the UN Security Council.  2010-06-18T14:38:01-05:00