ISIS Iran Report

ISIS Reports June - September 5, 2014: Iran

September 10, 2014

Over the summer, ISIS closely monitored the ongoing P5+1 negotiations with Iran and published a series of reports analyzing the technical aspects of these negotiations with a view to ensuring that any comprehensive deal eventually reached is a sound one.

Please see below for a list of ISIS reports published between June and September 5, 2014.


ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report
David Albright, Paulina Izewicz, Andrea Stricker, and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini
September 5, 2014

On September 5, 2014 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released its quarterly report on the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in Iran and the status of Iran’s compliance with the United Nation Security Council resolutions.  ISIS made available this report on its web sites and provided an analysis of it.

Update on Parchin: A Necessary Piece of a Comprehensive Nuclear Deal
David Albright, Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, Andrea Stricker, and Daniel Schnur
September 3, 2014

As of late August 2014, the Islamic Republic of Iran had refused to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to visit the Parchin site, where high explosive activities related to nuclear weapons development are alleged to have taken place.  Addressing the IAEA’s concerns about activities at Parchin and other allegations about the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program is fundamental to Iran satisfying its safeguards obligations and a prerequisite to achieving a long-term agreement under the Joint Plan of Action between the P5+1 and Iran.

Centrifuge Research and Development Limitations in Iran
Institute for Science and International Security
August 29, 2014

Iran’s centrifuge research and development (R&D) program poses several risks to the verifiability of a comprehensive solution under the Joint Plan of Action. Negotiations on a comprehensive solution should seek to place further limitations on this program and establish effective and expanded monitoring practices as part of an agreement on a mutually defined enrichment program with agreed parameters.

Time is Short for Iran to Address IAEA’s Nuclear Weapon Concerns
Institute for Science and International Security
August 1, 2014

In May 2014, Iran and the IAEA agreed on a third of a series of measures under their November 2013 Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation aimed at addressing the IAEA’s concerns with regard to Iran’s nuclear program; two of these measures are directly related to the PMD file. As the August 25 deadline for fulfilling the third tranche of commitments pass, Iran has reportedly done little to meet its commitments on these two PMD issues.

Iran’s Near 20 Percent Stock: Status and Need to Reduce Size
David Albright and Paulina Izewicz
July 31, 2014

As of the end of the interim period, Iran’s oxide stock of near 20 percent LEU was large; in fact, it was sufficiently large that if it were reconverted into hexafluoride form, it could produce, if further enriched, enough weapon-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon. Since reconversion is straightforward and can be done in a matter of months, any long term agreement limiting Iran’s nuclear program should reduce the size of this stock, via down-blending or shipment overseas, to below 100 kilograms.

“The Six’s” Guiding Principles in Negotiating with Iran
David Albright, Olli Heinonen, and Andrea Stricker
July 22, 2014

The negotiations in Vienna have shown that the principles driving the positions of the “The Six”—the United States, Britain, France, Germany, China, and Russia—differ markedly from those of Iran. Based on several discussions with senior members of the Six, the principles underpinning a deal must include: 1) sufficient response time in case of violations; 2) a nuclear program meeting Iran’s practical needs; 3) adequate irreversibility of constraints; 4) stable provisions; and 5) adequate verification.

Iranian Breakout Study Drastically Overestimates Time to Nuclear Weapon
David Albright and Andrea Stricker
June 17, 2014

An Iranian website, posted an apparently quasi-official government study, How long would an Iranian ‘breakout’ really take? However, this study contains mistakes and uses unwarranted assumptions to arrive at its conclusions. Using its data and correcting for mistakes, ISIS arrived at a breakout estimate of 2-3 months in terms of the time to produce 25 kilograms of WGU, instead of its estimate of a minimum of 18 months.

Comments on the Princeton Group’s Proposal on Iran
June 12, 2014

At the core of a recent set of proposals titled “Agreeing on Limits for Iran’s Centrifuge Program: A Two-Stage Strategy,” is an acceptance that Iran should be able to build, while negotiating a second phase to a long term agreement in the next five to seven years, enough newer-generation advanced centrifuges so that by 2021 it could produce sufficient enriched uranium to fuel a commercial nuclear power reactor. This is a massive enrichment capacity. Enabling the creation of such a capacity during the period of a long term agreement may be consistent with Iran’s negotiating position, but it is way outside the bounds of the positions of the United States and its allies.

Five Compromises to Avoid in a Comprehensive Agreement with Iran
David Albright, Olli Heinonen, and Andrea Stricker
June 3, 2014

A long term, comprehensive solution under the Joint Plan of Action needs to ensure Iran uses nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes. Any such agreement will be complex and require a range of interrelated provisions. We have evaluated five commonly discussed proposals based on a set of criteria, including breakout potential, reversibility, stability, and verifiability and found them flawed. As a result, they should not be part of a long term agreement.


email us twitter Share on Facebook