P5+1 Agreement Reports


January 12, 2017: Comment on New Joint Commission Decision to Address Iran’s Hold Up Material at the EUPP,

David Albright’s comments on the process outlined for irrecoverability of low enriched uranium hold up in the EUPP in Iran.

December 21, 2016: Heavy Water Loophole in the Iran Deal,

A priority is ending Iran’s overproduction and sale of heavy water.

November 15, 2016: Analysis of the IAEA’s Fourth Iran Deal Report: Time of Change,

The Institute’s analysis of the latest IAEA report on Iran’s compliance with UNSCR 2231 enshrining the JCPOA

September 9, 2016: Analysis of the IAEA’s Third Iran Deal Report: Filling in Missing Details,

Institute analysis of the IAEA’s September 8, 2016 report on Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA and UNSCR 2231

September 6, 2016: In Response to Reactions over our JCPOA Exemptions Paper,

Comments on reactions to our JCPOA exemptions paper.

September 1, 2016: JCPOA Exemptions Revealed,

Several exemptions to JCPOA terms have been made in secret by the P5+1 and Iran.

August 2, 2016: Iran’s Long-Term Centrifuge Enrichment Plan: Providing Needed Transparency,

Iran’s long term enrichment and R&D program and associated breakout timelines.

July 7, 2016: Iranian Atomic Energy Organization Attempted Carbon Fiber Procurement,

Iran’s AEOI recently made an attempt to purchase tons of controlled carbon fiber.

July 7, 2016: Previously Sanctioned Iranian Entities Doing Business in China,

Many previously sanctioned Iranian entities are now very active in procuring goods in China, which warrants scrutiny and concern.

May 31, 2016: IAEA’s Second JCPOA Report: Key Information Still Missing,

The IAEA Iran JCPOA implementation reports continue to lack technical details about critical implementation issues.

May 27, 2016: Update on Iran’s Stocks of 3.5 Percent Low Enriched Uranium,

Blocking unjustified exemptions to the 300 kilogram cap, Revised from May 23, 2016.

May 26, 2016: State Department’s questionable testimony on U.S. heavy water purchase from Iran,

Clarification needed on State Department testimony regarding availability of non-Iranian heavy water.

May 23, 2016: Update on Iran’s Stocks of 3.5 Percent Low Enriched Uranium,

Blocking unjustified exemptions to the 300 kilogram cap

May 23, 2016: U.S. Purchase of Iran’s Heavy Water: Encouraging a Dangerous Nuclear Supplier,

A planned U.S. purchase of Iranian heavy water has several negative implications.

April 21, 2016: The Iran Nuclear Deal’s Procurement Channel: Overcoming Post-Implementation Day Issues,

Investing the time, attention, and resources is critical to ensuring that the Procurement Channel will be successful at regulating exports of proliferation-sensitive goods to Iran.

February 26, 2016: IAEA’s First Post-Implementation Day Report: Key Information Missing,

The IAEA report shows that Iran appears to be living up to most of its commitments, but the report is devoid of details about critical implementation issues.

January 17, 2016: Implementation Day Report,

ISIS’s analysis of the IAEA’s report on Iran’s implementation of its JCPOA commitments.

December 23, 2015: Making Sense of Iran’s Stocks of 3.5 and Near 20 percent LEU,

Iran continues to hold a large stock of 3.5 and near 20 LEU, most of which will need to be blended down or be shipped out of Iran under the terms of the JCPOA.

December 14, 2015: Taking Stock of Iran’s Near 20 Percent LEU,

Iran continues to hold a relatively large stock of near 20 LEU, much of which will need to be blended down or be shipped out of Iran under the terms of the JCPOA.

December 11, 2015: JCPOA Procurement Channel: Architecture and Issues,

We present a set of slides resulting from various discussions in the United States and Europe about the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s procurement channel.  The presentation covers the architecture of the channel and issues foreseen in its implementation.  We would appreciate comments and feedback.

December 8, 2015: Analysis of the IAEA’s Report on the PMD of Iran’s Nuclear Program,

ISIS assesses that Iran did not provide the IAEA with anywhere near the kind of transparency and cooperation required for the IAEA to conclude its investigation.

December 3, 2015: Parchin in the IAEA’s Final Assessment on the PMD to Iran’s Nuclear Program,

ISIS’s analysis of the IAEA’s PMD report on the topic of the Parchin military site in Iran

December 2, 2015: Initial Reactions to the IAEA’s PMD Report,

ISIS’s initial reactions to the IAEA report on the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program

November 18, 2015: Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report,

Analysis of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s latest safeguards report on Iran dated November 18, 2015.

November 4, 2015: Addressing the Military Dimensions of Iran’s Nuclear Program,

The Obama administration needs to publicly state that the results of the IAEA’s investigation in Iran are critical and are linked to sanctions relief.

September 28, 2015: If You Give a Mouse a Cookie,

Prisoner swaps with Iran would be misguided policy and only encourage Iran to detain additional U.S. citizens over its illicit procurement violations or other policy objectives.

September 22, 2015: IAEA Visit to the Parchin Site,

IAEA access to the Parchin site is an important accomplishment, but the manner in which environmental samples were taken raises troubling precedents.

September 16, 2015: Additional Taiwan-Based Element of Iranian Military Goods Procurement Network Exposed,

Another part of a network prosecuted for conspiring to violate U.S. export control laws and transship dual-use military equipment from the United States to Iran.

September 11, 2015: Parchin Site Update and Debate,

An analysis of the recent Parchin site/IAEA inspection debate and a review of criticisms of our findings

August 31, 2015: Preliminary Assessment of the JCPOA Procurement Channel,

Regulation of Iran’s Future Nuclear and Civil Imports and Considerations for the Future

August 27, 2015: ISIS Analysis of the IAEA Iran Safeguards Report,

ISIS’s analysis of the IAEA’s August 2015 Iran safeguards report.

August 18, 2015: Breakout Timelines Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,

An analysis of the critical criteria of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that a twelve month breakout timeline is necessary for Iran’s remaining gas centrifuge program.

August 13, 2015: Flawed Analysis by Robert Kelley in IHS Jane’s 360,

Robert Kelley has written a misleading, inaccurate report in IHS Jane’s 360 about a suspect site at the Parchin military complex and our institute’s analysis of that site.

August 10, 2015: WP Op-Ed: What Iran’s Hostile Reaction to the Parchin Issue Means for the Nuclear Deal,

If Iran sticks to its strategy, one can expect an impasse that includes Iran refusing to allow the IAEA the access it needs to sites and scientists within the coming months.

August 7, 2015: Satellite Imagery Does Not Support Iranian Road Work Claim at Parchin,

No visible evidence to support Iran’s counter claims about renewed activity at Parchin.

August 5, 2015: Renewed Activity at the Parchin Site in Iran,

Satellite images show renewed activity at a site at the Parchin military complex that is linked to past high explosive work on nuclear weapons.

August 4, 2015: Testimony of David Albright before SFRC on JCPOA,

Hearing entitled “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA): Non-Proliferation, Inspections, and Nuclear Constraints”

July 28, 2015: ISIS Analysis of JCPOA (Verification and Heavy Water Reactor Restrictions),

ISIS’s analysis of two key aspects of Iran’s nuclear program under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

July 22, 2015: ISIS Analysis of JCPOA (LEU Cap, Civil Nuclear Benefits, JCPOA Fundamental Goal),

ISIS’s analysis of three key aspects of Iran’s nuclear program under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

July 21, 2015: ISIS Analysis of JCPOA (LEU Stocks, Plutonium Pathway, and PMD),

ISIS’s analysis of four key parts of Iran’s nuclear program under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

July 3, 2015: On-Going Debate Over Iran’s Newly Produced LEU Hexafluoride,

The fact that Iran has not fully converted its LEU hexafluoride stocks to dioxide matters.

July 2, 2015: Resolving the IAEA’s PMD Concerns Concretely Prior to the Lifting of Key Sanctions,

During the implementation phase of an agreement, Iran must demonstrate, and the IAEA certify, Iranian cooperation with the IAEA investigation into the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program.

July 2, 2015: Iran’s Newly Produced Low Enriched Uranium Hexafluoride: Not Fully Converted,

Iran has yet to fully convert its newly produced LEU to dioxide form as required by the JPA

June 25, 2015: Testimony of David Albright before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

Evaluating key components of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

June 2, 2015: Iran’s Stock of Less than Five Percent Low Enriched Uranium-June 2015 Update,

Iran has fallen behind in its pledge to convert its newly produced LEU hexafluoride into oxide form.

May 29, 2015: ISIS’s Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report,

ISIS’s analysis of the IAEA’s latest report on the status of Iran’s compliance with its safeguards obligations.

May 5, 2015: Case Study: Skilled Procurement Ring Charged in Illegally Obtaining Goods for Iran,

ISIS’s analysis of the April 16, 2015, indictment of five individuals and four companies on 24 counts related to illegally exporting sensitive items to Iran.

May 4, 2015: The U.S. Fact Sheet’s Missing Parts: Iran’s Near 20 Percent LEU,

ISIS’s analysis of Iran’s current stock of near 20 percent low enriched uranium (LEU).

April 22, 2015: HFAC Testimony: Adequate Verification Under a Comprehensive Iran Nuclear Deal,

Several measures must be included in a final deal with Iran to ensure adequate verification.

April 13, 2015: ISIS Note:  Why Access to Iranian Military Sites Matters in a Long-Term Deal,

In a final deal, IAEA must have right to inspect military sites where it has evidence of suspicious nuclear-related activities.

April 11, 2015: P5+1/Iran Framework: Needs Strengthening,

ISIS’s analysis of the P5+1/Iran framework and recommendations for strengthening it.

March 30, 2015: Preventing Proliferation Assistance between Iran and other Proliferant States or Entities,

P5+1 negotiators must include provisions in a deal preventing Iran from receiving proliferation-relevant foreign assistance.

February 19, 2015: ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report,

ISIS’s analysis of the IAEA’s latest report on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in Iran

February 19, 2015: ISIS’s initial findings from the Iran safeguards report,

ISIS’s initial analysis of the IAEA Iran Safeguards report.

December 16, 2014: Update on IR-5 Centrifuge Issue: Taking Stock,

In the debate over the IR-5 centrifuge feeding by Iran, it is clear the Joint Plan of Action did not allow it.

December 12, 2014: Stopping Iran’s Illicit Nuclear Procurement,

Any long term agreement with Iran must ensure that illicit nuclear procurement is both prohibited and prevented.

December 8, 2014: Iran’s Stock of near 20 Percent LEU under the Extension of the Joint Plan of Action,

Despite the fact that Iran no longer has a stock of near 20 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) in hexafluoride form, it retains a significant portion of this material in the form of oxide.

December 3, 2014: Testimony of David Albright before Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

Hearing: Dismantling Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Next Steps To Achieve A Comprehensive Deal, Video here

November 25, 2014: Update on Iran’s Stock of Less than Five Percent Low Enriched Uranium,

Status of Iran’s commitment to convert newly produced 3.5 percent LEU to oxide form.

November 24, 2014: Analysis of Status of Iran’s Compliance with the Joint Plan of Action,

ISIS’s analysis of the IAEA’s monthly report on the status of Iran’s commitment under the interim agreement of the Joint Plan of Action.

November 20, 2014: A Note on Iran’s IR-5 Centrifuge Feeding,

Controversy over Iran’s feeding of an IR-5 centrifuge

November 18, 2014: Testimony of David Albright before House Subcommittee,

ISIS President David Albright testified today before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade.  The hearing was titled “Iranian Nuclear Talks: Negotiating a Bad Deal?”

November 18, 2014: Revisiting Iran’s Stock of Near 20 Percent LEU,

The IAEA has confirmed that Iran no longer has a stock of near 20 percent LEU in hexafluoride form. However, Iran retains a large near 20 percent LEU stock in oxide form.

November 18, 2014: Evaluating Iran’s Stock of Less than Five Percent Low Enriched Uranium,

Iran’s stock of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride has increased during the last few months. To meet its obligations under the interim deal of the JPA, Iran needs to convert about 500 kilograms of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride to oxide form prior to November 24, 2014.

November 6, 2014: Covering all the Iran Nuclear Breakout Paths in the P5+1 Negotiations,

Ensuring a long term agreement covers all potential Nuclear Breakout Paths.

September 24, 2014: Technical Note: Making Sense out of the IR-8 Centrifuge,

Iranian nuclear officials recently announced that centrifuge experts were developing the IR-8 centrifuge, a machine they claimed was 16 times more capable than the current generation IR-1 centrifuge.

September 23, 2014: Technical Note: Making Sense out of Iran’s Offers to Cut its SWUs,

This week in New York, Iranian officials may talk again about reducing the annual SWUs of the installed centrifuges. Any such Iranian offer that does not explicitly state that centrifuge numbers will be reduced should be treated with skepticism.

September 22, 2014: Compendium of ISIS’s Reports and Recommendations on the P5+1/Iran Long-Term Deal Negotiations,

This compendium of ISIS findings provides information and insight into the on-going negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive solution between Iran and the P5+1.

September 3, 2014: Update on Parchin: A Necessary Piece of a Comprehensive Nuclear Deal,

Addressing the IAEA’s concerns about activities at Parchin and other allegations about the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program is fundamental to Iran satisfying its safeguards obligations and a prerequisite to achieving a long-term agreement under the Joint Plan of Action between the P5+1 and Iran.

August 29, 2014: Centrifuge Research and Development Limitations in Iran,

Iran’s centrifuge research and development (R&D) program poses several risks to the verifiability of a comprehensive solution under the Joint Plan of Action.

August 1, 2014: Time is Short for Iran to Address IAEA’s Nuclear Weapon Concerns,

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reportedly expressed concerns that the Islamic Republic of Iran will not address by a late August deadline two key outstanding issues concerning allegations of Iran’s past and possibly ongoing work on nuclear weapons, or the so- called “possible military dimensions” (PMD) to its nuclear program.

July 31, 2014: Iran’s Near 20 Percent Stock: Status and Need to Reduce Size,

Iran’s oxide stock of near 20 percent LEU is large; in fact, it is sufficiently large that if it were reconverted into hexafluoride form, it could produce, if further enriched, enough weapon-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon.

July 22, 2014: “The Six’s” Guiding Principles in Negotiating with Iran,

The recent negotiations in Vienna have shown that the principles driving the positions of the “The Six”—the United States, Britain, France, Germany, China, and Russia—differ markedly from those of Iran.

June 17, 2014: Iranian Breakout Study Drastically Overestimates Time to Nuclear Weapon,

Iranian breakout study is methodologically flawed in many important ways.

June 12, 2014: Comments on the Princeton Group’s Proposal on Iran,

A large Iranian enrichment program should not be the goal of a long-term agreement with the P5+1.

June 3, 2014: Five Compromises to Avoid in a Comprehensive Agreement with Iran,

Five commonly discussed proposals are flawed. They should not be part of a long term agreement with Iran.

May 27, 2014: Spin, Spin, Spin,

Did Iran resolve the IAEA’s concern about its past work on EBWs? The answer has to be no or probably not.

May 23, 2014: ISIS Analysis of the IAEA Iran Safeguards Report,

ISIS’s analysis of the IAEA Iran safeguards report from May 23, 2014

May 15, 2014: Making Iran Come Clean About Its Nukes,

What is the point of striking an agreement with Iran if Tehran will be able to hide its weapons work?

Read the op-ed by David Albright and Bruno Tertrais on the Wall Street Journal website.

May 13, 2014: Parchin: Resolution Urgent,

Prospects of a Comprehensive Solution dim if Iran remains intransigent on Parchin.

February 25, 2014: Changes Visible at Parchin Nuclear Site,

Recent commercial satellite imagery shows that new activity is taking place at the site.

February 21, 2014: ISIS Analysis of the IAEA Iran Safeguards Report,

ISIS’s analysis of the Iatest IAEA safeguards report on Iran

February 17, 2014: Maintaining at Least a Six-Month Breakout Timeline in Iran,

The need to permanently reduce Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent enriched LEU

February 12, 2014: Exploding Bridge Wire Issue: A Crack in the Door?,

Iran has pledged to answer the IAEA’s questions about its past work on Exploding Bridge Wire (EBW) detonators.  Iran must admit any past work on nuclear weapons associated with this technology.

January 27, 2014: Iran’s Centrifuge Research and Development Program,

The interim steps under the Joint Plan of Action are not expected to seriously affect Iran’s centrifuge research and development program. 

January 20, 2014: Defining Iranian Nuclear Programs in a Comprehensive Solution under the Joint Plan of Action,

The necessary provisions of a comprehensive agreement with Iran.

January 13, 2014: Update on Fordow Centrifuge Site: Future Uncertain,

Recent satellite imagery of one of Iran’s most contentious nuclear sites: the Fordow enrichment plant.

November 14, 2013: ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report,

ISIS’s analysis of the November 14, 2013 IAEA Iran safeguards report

November 5, 2013: Determining the Irreducible Elements of an Interim Agreement with Iran:  A Freeze Plus,

A list of irreducible elements that should be goal achievements of a negotiated interim agreement.