- January 2017
- December 2016
- November 2016
- September 2016
- August 2016
- July 2016
- June 2016
- May 2016
- April 2016
- February 2016
- January 2016
- December 2015
- November 2015
- September 2015
- August 2015
- July 2015
- June 2015
- May 2015
- April 2015
- March 2015
- February 2015
- December 2014
- November 2014
- October 2014
- September 2014
- August 2014
- July 2014
- June 2014
- May 2014
- April 2014
- March 2014
- February 2014
- January 2014
- December 2013
- November 2013
- October 2013
- September 2013
- August 2013
- July 2013
- June 2013
- May 2013
- April 2013
- March 2013
- February 2013
- January 2013
- December 2012
- November 2012
- October 2012
- September 2012
- August 2012
P5+1 Agreement Reports
David Albright’s comments on the process outlined for irrecoverability of low enriched uranium hold up in the EUPP in Iran.
November 15, 2016: Analysis of the IAEA’s Fourth Iran Deal Report: Time of Change,
The Institute’s analysis of the latest IAEA report on Iran’s compliance with UNSCR 2231 enshrining the JCPOA
September 6, 2016: In Response to Reactions over our JCPOA Exemptions Paper,
Comments on reactions to our JCPOA exemptions paper.
Iran’s long term enrichment and R&D program and associated breakout timelines.
Many previously sanctioned Iranian entities are now very active in procuring goods in China, which warrants scrutiny and concern.
May 27, 2016: Update on Iran’s Stocks of 3.5 Percent Low Enriched Uranium,
Blocking unjustified exemptions to the 300 kilogram cap, Revised from May 23, 2016.
May 23, 2016: Update on Iran’s Stocks of 3.5 Percent Low Enriched Uranium,
Blocking unjustified exemptions to the 300 kilogram cap
Investing the time, attention, and resources is critical to ensuring that the Procurement Channel will be successful at regulating exports of proliferation-sensitive goods to Iran.
January 17, 2016: Implementation Day Report,
ISIS’s analysis of the IAEA’s report on Iran’s implementation of its JCPOA commitments.
December 14, 2015: Taking Stock of Iran’s Near 20 Percent LEU,
Iran continues to hold a relatively large stock of near 20 LEU, much of which will need to be blended down or be shipped out of Iran under the terms of the JCPOA.
December 8, 2015: Analysis of the IAEA’s Report on the PMD of Iran’s Nuclear Program,
ISIS assesses that Iran did not provide the IAEA with anywhere near the kind of transparency and cooperation required for the IAEA to conclude its investigation.
December 2, 2015: Initial Reactions to the IAEA’s PMD Report,
ISIS’s initial reactions to the IAEA report on the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program
November 4, 2015: Addressing the Military Dimensions of Iran’s Nuclear Program,
The Obama administration needs to publicly state that the results of the IAEA’s investigation in Iran are critical and are linked to sanctions relief.
September 22, 2015: IAEA Visit to the Parchin Site,
IAEA access to the Parchin site is an important accomplishment, but the manner in which environmental samples were taken raises troubling precedents.
September 11, 2015: Parchin Site Update and Debate,
An analysis of the recent Parchin site/IAEA inspection debate and a review of criticisms of our findings
August 27, 2015: ISIS Analysis of the IAEA Iran Safeguards Report,
ISIS’s analysis of the IAEA’s August 2015 Iran safeguards report.
August 13, 2015: Flawed Analysis by Robert Kelley in IHS Jane’s 360,
Robert Kelley has written a misleading, inaccurate report in IHS Jane’s 360 about a suspect site at the Parchin military complex and our institute’s analysis of that site.
No visible evidence to support Iran’s counter claims about renewed activity at Parchin.
August 4, 2015: Testimony of David Albright before SFRC on JCPOA,
Hearing entitled “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA): Non-Proliferation, Inspections, and Nuclear Constraints”
ISIS’s analysis of three key aspects of Iran’s nuclear program under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
July 3, 2015: On-Going Debate Over Iran’s Newly Produced LEU Hexafluoride,
The fact that Iran has not fully converted its LEU hexafluoride stocks to dioxide matters.
Iran has yet to fully convert its newly produced LEU to dioxide form as required by the JPA
Iran has fallen behind in its pledge to convert its newly produced LEU hexafluoride into oxide form.
ISIS’s analysis of the April 16, 2015, indictment of five individuals and four companies on 24 counts related to illegally exporting sensitive items to Iran.
Several measures must be included in a final deal with Iran to ensure adequate verification.
April 11, 2015: P5+1/Iran Framework: Needs Strengthening,
ISIS’s analysis of the P5+1/Iran framework and recommendations for strengthening it.
February 19, 2015: ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report,
ISIS’s analysis of the IAEA’s latest report on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in Iran
December 16, 2014: Update on IR-5 Centrifuge Issue: Taking Stock,
In the debate over the IR-5 centrifuge feeding by Iran, it is clear the Joint Plan of Action did not allow it.
Despite the fact that Iran no longer has a stock of near 20 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) in hexafluoride form, it retains a significant portion of this material in the form of oxide.
November 25, 2014: Update on Iran’s Stock of Less than Five Percent Low Enriched Uranium,
Status of Iran’s commitment to convert newly produced 3.5 percent LEU to oxide form.
November 20, 2014: A Note on Iran’s IR-5 Centrifuge Feeding,
Controversy over Iran’s feeding of an IR-5 centrifuge
November 18, 2014: Revisiting Iran’s Stock of Near 20 Percent LEU,
The IAEA has confirmed that Iran no longer has a stock of near 20 percent LEU in hexafluoride form. However, Iran retains a large near 20 percent LEU stock in oxide form.
November 6, 2014: Covering all the Iran Nuclear Breakout Paths in the P5+1 Negotiations,
Ensuring a long term agreement covers all potential Nuclear Breakout Paths.
September 23, 2014: Technical Note: Making Sense out of Iran’s Offers to Cut its SWUs,
This week in New York, Iranian officials may talk again about reducing the annual SWUs of the installed centrifuges. Any such Iranian offer that does not explicitly state that centrifuge numbers will be reduced should be treated with skepticism.
September 3, 2014: Update on Parchin: A Necessary Piece of a Comprehensive Nuclear Deal,
Addressing the IAEA’s concerns about activities at Parchin and other allegations about the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program is fundamental to Iran satisfying its safeguards obligations and a prerequisite to achieving a long-term agreement under the Joint Plan of Action between the P5+1 and Iran.
August 1, 2014: Time is Short for Iran to Address IAEA’s Nuclear Weapon Concerns,
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reportedly expressed concerns that the Islamic Republic of Iran will not address by a late August deadline two key outstanding issues concerning allegations of Iran’s past and possibly ongoing work on nuclear weapons, or the so- called “possible military dimensions” (PMD) to its nuclear program.
July 22, 2014: “The Six’s” Guiding Principles in Negotiating with Iran,
The recent negotiations in Vienna have shown that the principles driving the positions of the “The Six”—the United States, Britain, France, Germany, China, and Russia—differ markedly from those of Iran.
Iranian breakout study is methodologically flawed in many important ways.
Five commonly discussed proposals are flawed. They should not be part of a long term agreement with Iran.
May 23, 2014: ISIS Analysis of the IAEA Iran Safeguards Report,
ISIS’s analysis of the IAEA Iran safeguards report from May 23, 2014
May 13, 2014: Parchin: Resolution Urgent,
Prospects of a Comprehensive Solution dim if Iran remains intransigent on Parchin.
March 25, 2014: Olli Heinonen on Iran’s implementation of the JPA
March 10, 2014: The Iran Primer - Centrifuges: Key to Final Nuclear Deal
February 21, 2014: ISIS Analysis of the IAEA Iran Safeguards Report,
ISIS’s analysis of the Iatest IAEA safeguards report on Iran
February 12, 2014: Exploding Bridge Wire Issue: A Crack in the Door?,
Iran has pledged to answer the IAEA’s questions about its past work on Exploding Bridge Wire (EBW) detonators. Iran must admit any past work on nuclear weapons associated with this technology.
The necessary provisions of a comprehensive agreement with Iran.
December 10, 2013: No Significant Changes Visible at Parchin Nuclear Site
November 25, 2013: The Rocky Path to a Long-Term Settlement with Iran
A list of irreducible elements that should be goal achievements of a negotiated interim agreement.