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P5+1 Agreement Reports
March 3, 2017: Analysis of the IAEA’s Fifth Iran Nuclear Deal Report,
Institute analysis of the IAEA’s fifth report on Iran’s compliance with UN Resolution 2231.
December 21, 2016: Heavy Water Loophole in the Iran Deal,
A priority is ending Iran’s overproduction and sale of heavy water.
September 9, 2016: Analysis of the IAEA’s Third Iran Deal Report: Filling in Missing Details,
Institute analysis of the IAEA’s September 8, 2016 report on Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA and UNSCR 2231
September 1, 2016: JCPOA Exemptions Revealed,
Several exemptions to JCPOA terms have been made in secret by the P5+1 and Iran.
Iran’s AEOI recently made an attempt to purchase tons of controlled carbon fiber.
May 31, 2016: IAEA’s Second JCPOA Report: Key Information Still Missing,
The IAEA Iran JCPOA implementation reports continue to lack technical details about critical implementation issues.
Clarification needed on State Department testimony regarding availability of non-Iranian heavy water.
A planned U.S. purchase of Iranian heavy water has several negative implications.
February 26, 2016: IAEA’s First Post-Implementation Day Report: Key Information Missing,
The IAEA report shows that Iran appears to be living up to most of its commitments, but the report is devoid of details about critical implementation issues.
December 23, 2015: Making Sense of Iran’s Stocks of 3.5 and Near 20 percent LEU,
Iran continues to hold a large stock of 3.5 and near 20 LEU, most of which will need to be blended down or be shipped out of Iran under the terms of the JCPOA.
December 11, 2015: JCPOA Procurement Channel: Architecture and Issues,
We present a set of slides resulting from various discussions in the United States and Europe about the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s procurement channel. The presentation covers the architecture of the channel and issues foreseen in its implementation. We would appreciate comments and feedback.
December 3, 2015: Parchin in the IAEA’s Final Assessment on the PMD to Iran’s Nuclear Program,
ISIS’s analysis of the IAEA’s PMD report on the topic of the Parchin military site in Iran
November 18, 2015: Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report,
Analysis of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s latest safeguards report on Iran dated November 18, 2015.
September 28, 2015: If You Give a Mouse a Cookie,
Prisoner swaps with Iran would be misguided policy and only encourage Iran to detain additional U.S. citizens over its illicit procurement violations or other policy objectives.
Another part of a network prosecuted for conspiring to violate U.S. export control laws and transship dual-use military equipment from the United States to Iran.
August 31, 2015: Preliminary Assessment of the JCPOA Procurement Channel,
Regulation of Iran’s Future Nuclear and Civil Imports and Considerations for the Future
August 18, 2015: Breakout Timelines Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,
An analysis of the critical criteria of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that a twelve month breakout timeline is necessary for Iran’s remaining gas centrifuge program.
If Iran sticks to its strategy, one can expect an impasse that includes Iran refusing to allow the IAEA the access it needs to sites and scientists within the coming months.
August 5, 2015: Renewed Activity at the Parchin Site in Iran,
Satellite images show renewed activity at a site at the Parchin military complex that is linked to past high explosive work on nuclear weapons.
ISIS’s analysis of two key aspects of Iran’s nuclear program under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
July 21, 2015: ISIS Analysis of JCPOA (LEU Stocks, Plutonium Pathway, and PMD),
ISIS’s analysis of four key parts of Iran’s nuclear program under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
During the implementation phase of an agreement, Iran must demonstrate, and the IAEA certify, Iranian cooperation with the IAEA investigation into the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program.
Evaluating key components of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
May 29, 2015: ISIS’s Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report,
ISIS’s analysis of the IAEA’s latest report on the status of Iran’s compliance with its safeguards obligations.
ISIS’s analysis of Iran’s current stock of near 20 percent low enriched uranium (LEU).
In a final deal, IAEA must have right to inspect military sites where it has evidence of suspicious nuclear-related activities.
P5+1 negotiators must include provisions in a deal preventing Iran from receiving proliferation-relevant foreign assistance.
February 19, 2015: ISIS’s initial findings from the Iran safeguards report,
ISIS’s initial analysis of the IAEA Iran Safeguards report.
December 12, 2014: Stopping Iran’s Illicit Nuclear Procurement,
Any long term agreement with Iran must ensure that illicit nuclear procurement is both prohibited and prevented.
December 3, 2014: Testimony of David Albright before Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Hearing: Dismantling Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Next Steps To Achieve A Comprehensive Deal, Video here
November 24, 2014: Analysis of Status of Iran’s Compliance with the Joint Plan of Action,
ISIS’s analysis of the IAEA’s monthly report on the status of Iran’s commitment under the interim agreement of the Joint Plan of Action.
November 18, 2014: Testimony of David Albright before House Subcommittee,
ISIS President David Albright testified today before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. The hearing was titled “Iranian Nuclear Talks: Negotiating a Bad Deal?”
November 18, 2014: Evaluating Iran’s Stock of Less than Five Percent Low Enriched Uranium,
Iran’s stock of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride has increased during the last few months. To meet its obligations under the interim deal of the JPA, Iran needs to convert about 500 kilograms of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride to oxide form prior to November 24, 2014.
September 24, 2014: Technical Note: Making Sense out of the IR-8 Centrifuge,
Iranian nuclear officials recently announced that centrifuge experts were developing the IR-8 centrifuge, a machine they claimed was 16 times more capable than the current generation IR-1 centrifuge.
This compendium of ISIS findings provides information and insight into the on-going negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive solution between Iran and the P5+1.
August 29, 2014: Centrifuge Research and Development Limitations in Iran,
Iran’s centrifuge research and development (R&D) program poses several risks to the verifiability of a comprehensive solution under the Joint Plan of Action.
July 31, 2014: Iran’s Near 20 Percent Stock: Status and Need to Reduce Size,
Iran’s oxide stock of near 20 percent LEU is large; in fact, it is sufficiently large that if it were reconverted into hexafluoride form, it could produce, if further enriched, enough weapon-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon.
June 12, 2014: Comments on the Princeton Group’s Proposal on Iran,
A large Iranian enrichment program should not be the goal of a long-term agreement with the P5+1.
May 27, 2014: Spin, Spin, Spin,
Did Iran resolve the IAEA’s concern about its past work on EBWs? The answer has to be no or probably not.
May 15, 2014: Making Iran Come Clean About Its Nukes,
What is the point of striking an agreement with Iran if Tehran will be able to hide its weapons work?
Read the op-ed by David Albright and Bruno Tertrais on the Wall Street Journal website.
February 25, 2014: Changes Visible at Parchin Nuclear Site,
Recent commercial satellite imagery shows that new activity is taking place at the site.
February 17, 2014: Maintaining at Least a Six-Month Breakout Timeline in Iran,
The need to permanently reduce Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent enriched LEU
January 27, 2014: Iran’s Centrifuge Research and Development Program,
The interim steps under the Joint Plan of Action are not expected to seriously affect Iran’s centrifuge research and development program.
January 13, 2014: Update on Fordow Centrifuge Site: Future Uncertain,
Recent satellite imagery of one of Iran’s most contentious nuclear sites: the Fordow enrichment plant.
November 26, 2013: Iran’s Negotiating Track with the IAEA
November 14, 2013: ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report,
ISIS’s analysis of the November 14, 2013 IAEA Iran safeguards report