Nuclear Sites
7th of Tir Industries (Seventh of Tir, Hafte Tir or Haftom e Tir Industries)
7th of Tir Industries (Seventh of Tir, Hafte Tir or Haftom e Tir Industries)
Seventh of Tir Industries is a DIO entity, which prior to the 2003 suspension, had responsibility for manufacturing several critical P1 centrifuge components. IAEA safeguards reports have not referred to this facility by name. The company takes its name from an important date on the Iranian calendar--the 7th of Tir--on which a bomb exploded at the headquarters of Iran’s Islamic Republic Party on June 28, 1981, killing more than seventy officials. A number of Iranian buildings or places now bear the name.
We do not know whether 7th of Tir continues to be involved in the production of centrifuge components. IIran suspended its centrifuge manufacturing efforts for a time between late 2003 (when it signed but did not ratify the Additional Protocol) and early February 2006, when it notified the IAEA that both its voluntary adherence to the Additional Protocol and its suspension of enrichment activity was over. Most information in the public domain regarding Iran’s centrifuge production and manufacturing reflects the period prior to its suspension of centrifuge R&D.
Centrifuge components were manufactured in a relatively small, unidentified facility within 7th of Tir. Under contract, DIO specialists made about twenty critical rotating components of the P1 centrifuge rotor. According to Vienna-based diplomats present at technical briefings by IAEA officials, this facility was originally contracted to make 10,000 sets of these centrifuge components, but had not finished making all of them prior to the suspension. To prevent IAEA monitoring what is a sensitive military site, Iran moved key centrifuge manufacturing equipment and components to Natanz and other AEOI sites.
This site manufactured one of the P1 centrifuge’s most sensitive parts, its bellows—a thin-walled cylindrical part—made from maraging steel. Iran secretly purchased 67 tonnes of this super strong steel in the United Kingdom, enough for approximately 100,000 bellows. Each centrifuge requires three bellows, giving Iran approximately enough steel for some 33,000 centrifuges. Iran may have purchased such a large quantity at one time, fearing that it would become only harder to procure should its centrifuge research and development became public. Apparently Iran was not able to buy the steel in tubes, which is the normal starting point for making a hollow bellows, so it bought metal rods.
Maraging steel is a sensitive commodity, whose purchase is controlled by suppliers. Iran may have found it easier to obtain if asking for rods. But the rod shape complicates the production of bellows. Iranian technicians reportedly had to first use a hot lance to pierce the rod and then cut out the center into a tube. This tube is then thinned to a wall thickness of only one millimeter on a specialized, precision flow-forming machine. Iran obtained this machine from the now defunct German firm Leifeld in 1985 and later obtained several more from this and anther firm. The location of these flow-forming machines is unknown, more than one of which can be used to make bellows.
Annex 1 of UN Security Council Resolution 1747 (2007) states that the facility is controlled by the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries group (AMIG), which is in turn owned by the Defense Industries Organization (DIO). UN Resolution 1737 (2006) states that 7th of Tir is “widely recognized as being directly involved in the nuclear program.”
A website advertising this firm’s civilian goods can be found here.
Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co
Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co
This firm is named in a UK government list of Iranian individuals and entities subject to financial sanctions, which can be found here. The UK states that the firm is involved in the production of centrifuge components, although ISIS could not identify its location or other possible names, one of which might duplicate another facility in this list. The firm is also named in Annex III of UN Security Council Resolution 1803 (2008).
Anarak nuclear waste disposal
Anarak nuclear waste disposal
Anarak is a nuclear waste disposal site. Iran told the IAEA in 2003 that waste resulting from the experiments irradiating UO2 targets and separating the plutonium at JHL was solidified and sent to Anarak.
Arak
Near the city of Arak is Iran’s heavy water production plant, which has been operational since 2006, and a heavy water reactor, which remains under construction. The reactor’s projected completion date is 2013, although this date may slip. Iran originally intended to build a hot cell facility at Arak for the separation of “long-lived radioisotopes,” believed to be a euphemism for plutonium, but in 2004 Iran informed the IAEA that it was abandoning that plan. It is expected to build hot cells to separate shorter-lived radioisotopes, such as cobalt-60 and iridium-192, for civilian applications.
Arak Heavy Water Production Plant at Khondab
Arak Hot Cells
Arak IR-40 Heavy Water Reactor
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
Iran’s civil nuclear program, headquartered in Tehran, falls under the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). It is led by Gholam-Reza Aghazadeh (sometimes spelled Gholamreza Aghazadeh or Aqazadeh), a former Minister of Petroleum who has held the position since 1997. Aghazadeh is seen as a technocrat who was worked diligently to recruit and train technical experts.
Bushehr Nuclear power plant
Bushehr Nuclear power plant
As of the summer of 2008, the Bushehr nuclear power reactor was scheduled to go critical in late 2008 or early 2009. The reactor, supplied by Russia, is a VVER-1000 design, with an electrical output of approximately 1000 megawatts-electric (MWe).
Russia agreed to supply all the enriched uranium fuel for Bushehr. In February 2005, it also finalized an agreement that will require Iran to return all spent fuel from Bushehr to Russia, although the irradiated fuel will initially be stored in Iran for several years, pending sufficient radioactive decay to allow the fuel’s safe transport.
The 82 tons of fuel that will eventually comprise the reactor’s first core were shipped to Iran in a series of shipments between mid-December 2007 and January 2008. The fuel is under IAEA safeguards in Iran.
See also Darkhovin, where Iran reportedly plans to build a second power reactor.
Darkhovin nuclear reactor
Iran announced in August 2008, that it had entered the design phase of planning for this facility, which will reportedly be a 360 megawatt reactor in the area of Darkhovin.
Defense Industries Organization
Defense Industries Organization
Iran’s state-owned Defense Industries Organization (DIO) is one of the main subsidiaries of Iran’s Ministry of Defense. Its primary responsibility is meeting the requirements of the armed forces of Iran, but it also exports products and engineering services. Through its subsidiaries and contractors, it has played an important role in Iran’s development of its centrifuge manufacturing capabilities. According to IAEA reports, substantial numbers of centrifuge components were manufactured at DIO workshops under contract with the AEOI. Two such workshops controlled by DIO are Khorasan Metallurgy Industries and 7th of Tir, both of which are named in UN Security Council Resolution 1737, Annex A.
According to the June 2004 IAEA report, DIO workshops were involved in the procurement of parts from abroad for the IR-2 (then referred to as the P-2) centrifuge. Initially Iran denied to the IAEA that any components had been procured from abroad. By 2004, Iran “acknowledged that, contrary to these earlier statements, it had imported some magnets relevant to P-2 centrifuges from Asian suppliers, and that the composite rotors that had been manufactured in Iran had in fact been fabricated in another workshop situated on a DIO site.”
The U.S. Department of State designated DIO on March 30, 2007 as an entity engaged in activities that have “materially contributed to the development of Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.”
Education Research Institute
Education Research Institute
Little information is available regarding the role of Iran’s Education Research Institute (ERI) in the nuclear program. It is cited in the May 2008 IAEA report as a “military-related” institute about which inspectors need to learn more. The report notes that “The Agency also needs to understand fully the reasons for the involvement of military related institutions in procurement for the nuclear programme.”
ERI is mentioned for the first time in IAEA reporting in the February 2007 report in the context of IAEA discussions with Iran “seeking clarification” about the role of ERI along with the Institute for Applied Physics (IAP), Kimia Maadan (KM), and the Physics Research Center (PHRC).
Esfahan
The AEOI operates many nuclear facilities east of Esfahan. Most publications refer to one organization, the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, as housing all these facilities. Annex 1 of UN Resolution 1747 (2007) lists the sites as the Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center.
The following use these site names in describing the multiple nuclear-related facilities near Esfahan.
Esfahan tunnel complex
Esfahan Uranium Conversion Facility
The Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan contains process lines to convert yellowcake into uranium oxide, uranium metal, and uranium hexafluoride. It began operations in June 2006.
According to information provided to the IAEA, Iran carried out most of its experiments in uranium conversion between 1981 and 1993 at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) and at other facilities at Esfahan. In 1991, Iran contracted to purchase a turn-key, industrial scale conversion facility from China. This contract was eventually canceled as a result of US pressure, but Iran retained the design information and built the plant on its own. Construction of the UCF began in the late 1990s.
Iran declared that it began construction of the UCF without building and testing a pilot scale plant. After extensive analysis, the IAEA accepted this declaration.
The UCF consists of several conversion lines, including the line for the conversion of yellowcake to UF6. The annual production capacity of the UCF is 200 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF6. The UF6 iis slated for the uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz. The UCF is also able to convert yellowcake, LEU and depleted uranium into UO2 and depleted uranium metal. Iran has told the IAEA indicates that they plan to build conversion lines for the production of natural and enriched (19.7%) uranium metal for research reactors, and natural UO2 for use in the heavy water reactor. Suspicions remain that the line to produce 19.7% uranium metal was originally intended to produce HEU metal for nuclear weapons.
Fuel Fabrication Laboratory (FFL)
In 1985, Iran began operating a Fuel Fabrication Laboratory (FFL) at Esfahan that it commissioned from a foreign supplier. Iran informed the IAEA of the FFL in 1993 and provided design information in 1998. It is still in operation. According to the IAEA, the FFL is suitable for producing small amounts of fuel pellets.
Uranium Chemistry Laboratory (UCL)
In the early 1980s, Iran commissioned from a foreign supplier the construction at a Uranium Chemistry Laboratory (UCL). According to the IAEA, in 1998, Iran declared that UCL had been closed down since 1987.
Zirconium Production Plant (ZPP)
Iran has built a Zirconium Production Plant which, when completed, will be able to produce 10 tonnes of zirconium tubing per year for nucler fuel cladding. Construction started in 2004. The ZPP, according to Iranian officials, will be able to produce zirconium sponge, zirconium alloy strip and bar, magnesium, hafnium, 99.99 percent pure magnesium, zirconium alloys, titanium and titanium alloys, and can do ferrous and non-ferrous metal casting.
Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center/Research Reactors
Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center/Research Reactors
According to the IAEA, Iran has a light water sub-critical reactor (LWSCR) that uses uranium metal fuel. The reactor operates only a few days per year. The Miniaturized Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) is a research reactor of Chinese origin. The MNSR has been in operation since the mid-1990s and has a lifetime supply of one kilogram of 90.2 percent enriched fuel. The Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor, supplied by China, went critical in 1995. There is also a decommissioned graphite sub-critical reactor (GSCR) which used uranium metal fuel.
For other Esfahan-area facilities, see here
Farayand Technique
Farayand Technique
According to Iranian statements to the IAEA, Farayand Technique, an important subsidiary of Kalaye Electric, had a number of roles in Iran’s centrifuge enrichment program. The IAEA reports that it was initially intended as a site for centrifuge assembly, but that Iranian officials decided it was too far from Natanz. It has conducted quality control activities for centrifuge components, including rotors, manufactured for the facilities at Natanz It received balancing machines from Kalaye Electric.
Farayand is believed to be located in a valley near 7th of Tir Industries, likely in an industrial park. Prior to Iran’s suspension of centrifuge R&D, it had multiple responsibilities, including making and assembling parts of the centrifuge’s bottom bearing. This part of the centrifuge is designed to hold a thin pin with a ball at its end that is attached to the bottom of the rotor assembly. The ball fits inside a cup, which allows the rotor to spin rapidly with little friction. Farayand also performed quality testing on components manufactured in the Esfahan area and had facilities for assembling and testing centrifuges. IAEA inspectors suspected that this site could have been intended as a back-up to the Kalaye Electric facility.
The IAEA has conducted extensive environmental sampling at Farayand because it was a site related to centrifuge manufacturing, assembly, and testing. Environmental samples taken from the balancing machines indicated the presence of enriched uranium which was eventually determined to be the result of cross-contamination of components that originated in Pakistan. The current status of operations at Farayand is unknown, as IAEA inspectors had access to the site only while Iran was adhering voluntarily to the Additional Protocol and the suspension agreements.
Fordow Uranium Enrichment Facility
Iran began constructing the Fordow uranium enrichment facility in secret as early as 2006. It was publicly revealed by President’s Obama, Sarkozy and Prime Minister Brown in September 2009, shortly after the United States, Britain and France presented evidence of the facility to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The facility designed to hold approximately 3,000 gas centrifuges and Iran originally planned to outfit the facility with IR-1 centrifuge machines. ISIS assessed that a fully-outfitted facility this size would give Iran the capability to secretly make enough weapon grade uranium for one bomb in less than a year. If Iran used 3.5 % enriched uranium as feedstock, it could make enough weapon grade uranium for a bomb in even less time.
Iran has changed its declared purpose for the Fordow enrichment facility several times in the following years. The IAEA has continued to seek clarification from Iran as to the purpose of the facility and how it fits in with Iran’s civil nuclear program.
Iran has installed four cascades of 174 IR-1 centrifuges at Fordow, where two sets of two cascades working in tandem are enriching 19.75 percent low enriched uranium (LEU). Iran has also installed at Fordow 2,088 empty IR-1 gas centrifuge outer casings along with the associated feed and withdrawal piping.
Institute of Applied Physics (IAP)
Institute of Applied Physics (IAP)
The IAEA’s November 2004 report states that the Applied Physics Institute was located at Lavisan-Shian, at least until 2002, and that the institute was involved in meeting the “education and R&D needs of the Ministry of Defense.”
The IAP arises in discussions between the IAEA and Iran on the “military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. It is one of three entities (the others being the Physics Research Center and the Educational Research Institute whose procurement activities have been questioned by the IAEA, in particular as it concerns “training courses on neutron calculations, the effect of shock waves on metal, enrichment/isotope separation and ballistic missiles. Efforts to procure spark gaps, shock wave software, neutron sources, special steel parts and radiation measurement equipment, including borehole gamma spectrometers….”
Iran has denied that the Institute’s work was related to EBW detonators and claims the items were for its oil logging industries. The IAEA continues to investigate the matter.
Kalaye Electric Company (also known as Kala Electric)
Kalaye Electric Company (Kala Electric)
According to IAEA reports (based on interviews of Iranian officials), Kalaye Electric, located in Tehran, was Iran’s primary centrifuge research, development, and manufacturing site until operations moved to the Natanz site in 2002. The name “Kalaye Electric” means “electric goods,” implying that it kept the name to help disguise the true purpose of the facility.
Iran declared that Kalaye Electric became the primary P-1 centrifuge development and testing site after such work was moved in 1995 from the TNRC. The IAEA has reported that between 1997 and 2002, Iran assembled and tested P1 centrifuges at Kalaye. Iran also admits to introducing UF6 gas into a centrifuge for the first time in 1999 and, in 2002, fed nuclear material into a small, 19-machine cascade. Iran used 1.9 kg of imported, undeclared Chinese UF6 to test centrifuge machines at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop between 1999 and 2002, before dismantling the centrifuge test facility at the end of 2002.
After the pilot fuel enrichment plant (PFEP) at Natanz became the primary centrifuge research and development facility, Kalaye Electric remained a component manufacturing site. Investigation into the site began after the publication of information about possible enrichment activities. The first organization to name the facility publicly was the National Council for Resistance of Iran (NCRI).
Following the public revelation of Kalaye Electric, media reports indicated that U.S. satellite imagery showed considerable activity at the site, suggesting that equipment was removed from the site, raising suspicions that Iran was attempting to hide activities before granting access to the IAEA. The IAEA asked to visit Kalaye in February 2003 and to take environmental samples to determine if any enriched uranium was produced at the site. Iran responded that the facility was a watch factory, but that it also made a few centrifuge components. It initially denied the inspectors’ requests to take environmental samples, claiming that it did not have to allow access until Iran implemented the IAEA additional protocol.
Iran subsequently relented and allowed the IAEA limited access in March 2003 and full access in May, but it refused to permit environmental sampling until August 2003. Iran took extraordinary steps to disguise the past use and purpose of this facility, including removing equipment and moving internal walls. Nonetheless, the IAEA was able to detect enriched uranium at this site, further pressuring Iran to declare fully its activities there and elsewhere
Karaj Agricultural and Medical Center
Karaj Agricultural and Medical Center
The IAEA first learned of Karaj from NCRI, which named the site and said it was related to gas centrifuge activities. The IAEA was initially denied access in May 2003, but finally was allowed to visit in August 2003.
Iran initially said that Karaj (also sometimes called Ramandeh) was primarily involved with agricultural studies said to be unrelated to nuclear fuel cycle activities. In October 2003, when Iran revealed the existence of the laser enrichment program, it declared that it had moved laser enrichment equipment from Lashkar Ab’ad to Karaj in May 2003. This material included uranium metal and a large vacuum vessel with associated hardware. Karaj also stored mass spectrometry equipment that had been used in support of AVLIS research. There is also radioactive waste storage at Karaj. Environmental samples were taken of all the equipment at Karaj.
Kaveh Cutting Tools
Kaveh Cutting Tools Complex, a part of Khorasan Metallurgy Industries, northeast of Tehran near the city of Mashhad, made scoops, molecular pumps and other components for the P1 centrifuge prior to the suspension of Iran’s enrichment program. It is unknown whether it continues to manufacture centrifuge components.
Khorasan Metallurgy Industries
Khorasan Metallurgy Industries
Khorasan is identified in Annex III of UN Security Council Resolution 1803 (2008) as a firm involved in the “production of centrifuge components” and subsidiary of the Ammunition Industries Group (AMIG) and Defense Industries Organization (DIO).
Kaveh Cutting Tools Complex, a part of Khorasan Metallurgy Industries, northeast of Tehran near the city of Mashhad, made the P1 centrifuges scoops, molecular pumps and other components. These are all stationary components in a centrifuge and easier to make than the rotating ones. For other companies involved in manufacturing centrifuge components, see this page.
Kimia Maadan
Kimia Maadan
Kimia Maadan (sometimes spelled Kimia Madan or simply KM) is a private company, registered on May 4, 2000, and named as an entity involved in Iran’s so-called “Green Salt” project whose aim was to convert uranium to uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) in a small-scale facility (capacity of one tonne per year of uranium tetrafluoride). The Green Salt project was identified as one of several projects described on files found on a laptop computer, and collectively called the “alleged studies,” which were smuggled from Iran and turned over to Western intelligence agencies. KM was also under contract from Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI) to develop the Gchine uranium mine. The February 2008 IAEA safeguards report details KM’s work on the Gchine mine project, noting that at its peak, the company employed some 100 people and that its primary task at Gchine was to undertake the “detailed design, to procure and install equipment and to put the Gchine UOC plant into operation.”
Kolahdouz
Kolahdouz
Kolahdouz is a military industrial complex located in western Tehran that was initially inspected by the IAEA in 2003 after the National Council of Resistance of Iran identified it as a site of covert development of centrifuges for uranium enrichment. The IAEA’s November 2004 report notes that on a visit “no work was seen at those locations that could be directly linked to uranium enrichment” and that environmental samples did not reveal “any indication of activity involving the use of nuclear material.”
Lashkar Ab’ad - Laser enrichment
Lashkar Ab’ad – Laser enrichment
Lashkar Ab’ad was Iran’s pilot plant for laser isotope separation until 2003. This site contained equipment including copper vapor lasers (CVL) that were designed to produce enrichment levels of 3.5-7%. The IAEA reported that the facility would have been capable of HEU production once all planned equipment was installed. There were several foreign suppliers to the laser enrichment program, including the United States, Germany, and Russia.
Iran took steps to conceal this facility from the IAEA. The IAEA first asked to visit Lashkar Ab’ad in May 2003 after the NCRI identified the site and said it was related to gas centrifuge activities. Iran eventually relented and allowed inspection in August 2003. Iran initially declared that Lashkar Ab’ad was devoted to laser fusion research and laser spectroscopy, and claimed that its laser program was unrelated to uranium enrichment. Iran also claimed that no nuclear material had been involved in the experiments.
Iran changed its declaration and acknowledged to the IAEA in late-October 2003 that a pilot plant for laser enrichment had been established at Lashkar Ab’ad in 2000, after initial development work was conducted at TNRC. Iran also stated that uranium laser enrichment experiments had been conducted in late 2002 and early 2003 using previously undeclared imported natural uranium metal. It was only after this October revelation that the IAEA was allowed to take environmental samples at this site. Some of the material and equipment from Lashkar Ab’ad was moved to Karaj in May 2003 to avoid detection by the IAEA.
In its report of February 2008, IAEA safeguards officials visited Lashkar Abad and reported that the laboratories were currently run by a private company producing and
developing laser equipment for industrial purposes. The report also noted that the former laser equipment has been dismantled with some of it stored at the site. The IAEA added: “The management of the company provided detailed information on current and planned activities, including plans for extensive new construction work, and stated that they are not carrying out, and are not planning, any uranium enrichment activities.”
See also Karaj Agricultural and Medical Center
Lavisan-Shian (Lavizan-Shian)
A number of institutions relevant to Iran’s nuclear R&D program have been based at Lavisan between 1989 and 2004. According to IAEA reports, the Physics Research Center was based there between 1989 and 1998 (at which time Iran states it became involved in bio-defense and “radioprotection” activities. In 2002 the Applied Physics Institute was located at the site.
Lavisan-Shian (Lavizan-Shian)
ISIS was first made aware of Lavisan-Shian in June 2004 by ABC News, which had learned of allegations that the site was involved in undeclared nuclear activity, and that authorities had razed part of the site possibly in an effort to conceal activities from IAEA inspectors.
ISIS obtained imagery of the site, located in Tehran, from August 2003 that showed large buildings inside a secure perimeter. In imagery taken on March 2004, the buildings have been removed and the earth scraped. Further clearing can be seen in imagery from May 2004. The site’s dismantlement raised concerns because it is the type of measure Iran might take if it were trying to defeat the IAEA’s environmental sampling capabilities.
The IAEA describes in its November 2004 report the history of the Lavisan site, in particular the role of the Physics Research Center in procuring nuclear-related equipment, some of which could have been used in an undeclared centrifuge effort.
Following the publication of ISIS’s report, the IAEA asked and received permission to visit the site. Iran told the IAEA that the site had no nuclear material requiring a declaration, and that no fuel cycle activities were conducted there.
Iran explained to the IAEA that the site was razed following a dispute between the municipality of Tehran and Ministry of Defense and the return of the land to the city for recreational use. Between 1989 and 2004, according to Iran, several military-related institutions were based at the facility. The Physics Research Center was established at Lavisan in 1989, to oversee “preparedness to combat and neutralization of casualties due to nuclear attacks and accidents and also support and provide scientific advice and services to the Ministry of Defence.” In a letter to the IAEA in August 2004, Iran stated that “no nuclear material declarable in accordance with the Agency’s safeguards was present” and reiterated its earlier statement that “no nuclear material and nuclear activities related to fuel cycle were carried out at Lavisan-Shian.”
The November 2004 IAEA report notes that after 1998 the facility became the Biological Study Center with a focus on “biological R&D and radioprotection” activities. In 2002, the Institute for Applied Physics (IAP) was also located at that site.
IAEA environmental samples taken at Lavisan showed no evidence of nuclear material, although the IAEA pointed out in the November 2004 safeguards report that the “detection of nuclear material in soil samples would be very difficult in light of the razing of the site.”
The role of the PHRC in Iran’s nuclear procurement remains an outstanding issue between the IAEA and Iran that is subject to continued discussions.
In its report of February 2008, the IAEA notes that it has asked Iran to clarify “a number of pro actions by the ERI, PHRC and IAP” which could relate to the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program, including “training courses on neutron calculations, the effect of shock waves on metal, enrichment/isotope separation and ballistic missiles. Efforts to procure spark gaps, shock wave software, neutron sources, special steel parts and radiation measurement equipment, including borehole gamma spectrometers.”
Ministry of Defense, Armed Forces and Logistics (MODAFL)
Ministry of Defense, Armed Forces and Logistics (MODAFL)
According to the Treasury Department’s designation of MODAFL as an Iranian entity subject to sanctions, it is responsible for overseeing Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and has been subject to sanctions previously for “missile technology proliferation activities.” The U.S. government asserts that MODAFL also has authority over Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which is responsible for “ballistic missile research, development and production activities and organizations, including the Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) and the Shahid Bakeri Industries Group (SBIG).” Both entities are named in UN Security Council Resolution 1737 and therefore subject to the UN sanctions contained in that resolution (primarily restrictions on trading with named entities).
MODAFL is reportedly the employer of the nuclear scientist Dr. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh who is believed to oversee a number of projects related to weaponization R&D. Fakhrizadeh, a nuclear engineer and reportedly a brigadier-general in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is also believed to oversee activities at Kimiaa Madan. The IAEA has sought unsuccessfully permission to interview Dr. Fakhrizadeh, who is named in Annex I to UN Security Council Resolution 1747 (2007) as a person involved in nuclear activities. He was also designated by the Department of State on July 8, 2008 as a person “of proliferation concern.” The finding notes that Fakhrizadeh was a senior scientist at the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and former head of the Physics Research Centre (PHRC), and that Iran has refused the IAEA’s requests to interview him.
For more on Dr. Fakhrizadeh and his role in Iran’s nuclear weapons-related R&D work see notes from the February 2008 IAEA briefing to UN missions.
Natanz
Iran’s uranium centrifuge program is based at Natanz. The site consists of two main facilities--a pilot fuel enrichment plant and a larger, underground fuel enrichment plant. As of September 2008, some 4,000 P-1 type centrifuges are enriching uranium at Natanz at a rate of approximately 2.0 kg per day. For imagery and additional information, see:
Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant
Parchin
Parchin
Parchin first surfaced internationally in August 2004 when ISIS was alerted by ABC News to allegations that the complex, some 30 kilometers southeast of Tehran, was being used for high explosives testing that may be consistent with that used for nuclear weapons research. Commercial satellite imagery of the site was released publicly by ISIS in September 2004. The large complex is dedicated to research, development, and production of ammunition, rockets, and high explosives. The site is owned by Iran’s DIO, and has hundreds of buildings and test sites.
Within the larger complex, there is an isolated, separately secured site at which it was believed the weapons-related research was taking place. Prior to public release of the imagery, the IAEA was aware of the facility through analysis of commercial satellite imagery and its potential for nuclear weapons-related work. Iran initially rebuffed IAEA requests to inspect the site, eventually allowing access to parts of the facility in early 2005.
On November 1, 2005 Agency inspectors were given access to a military site at Parchin and were able to take several environmental samples. The IAEA’s February 2006 report notes that “The Agency did not observe any unusual activities in the buildings visited, and the results of the analysis of environmental samples did not indicate the presence of nuclear material at those locations.” Visual inspection showed that sites were not as capable as suggested by satellite imagery. Although this visit dampened suspicions that this sites was dedicated to high explosive testing for nuclear weapons, suspicions about the Parchin site persist and more inspections are warranted.
Pars Trash (Tarash)
Pars Trash (Tarash)
Pars Trash, a subsidiary of Kalaye Electric located in Tehran, is another centrifuge site that received equipment from Kalaye Electric in particular for Iran’s P-2/IR-2 centrifuge development effort.
Pars Trash, a small company employing about ten people, is located in Tehran among warehouses and light industrial buildings about a kilometer west of the Kalaye Electric facility. It manufactured the centrifuge’s outer casings. These are the thick aluminum tubes that house the centrifuge rotor assembly and, in the case of an accident, prevent broken pieces of the thin-walled rotor assembly, which can act like shrapnel, from injuring or even killing bystanders. Pars Trash was originally a small private factory involved in making automobile parts. It went bankrupt and was bought by the Kalaye Electric Company, or its subsidiary Farayand, for the three expensive computer-operated machine tools it owned, which could be adapted to the manufacture of centrifuge components.
An engineer married to the plant manager is believed to have been the backbone of the operation. She programmed and set up the machines to make centrifuge components and ensured their quality, before turning the operation over to a technician who subsequently operated the automated machines to produce thousands of components.
The current status of operations at Pars is unknown as IAEA inspectors had access to the site only while Iran was adhering voluntarily to the Additional Protocol.
Physics Research Center
According to the November 2004 IAEA report, the Physics Research Center was established at Lavisan-Shian in 1989 for “preparedness to combat and neutralization of casualties due to nuclear attacks and accidents (nuclear defence) and also support and provide scientific advice and services to the Ministry of Defence.” Iran insisted that “no nuclear material and nuclear activities related to fuel cycle were carried out at Lavisan-Shian.” The same report notes that activities at the PHRC were halted in 1998 and the focus of work shifted to biological R&D and radioprotection activities.
Throughout 2006 the IAEA continued to investigate reports that the PHRC had sought to acquire dual-use equipment relevant to “enrichment and conversion activities.” In January 2006, Iran provided the IAEA with documentation reflecting unsuccessful procurement attempts for “electric drive equipment, power supply equipment and laser equipment, including a dye laser” as well as “balancing machines, mass spectrometers, magnets handling equipment.” Iran stated that the equipment was intended for university instruction at a laboratory at which the head of PHRC was also a professor. Iran refused IAEA requests to speak with the professor).
The February 2008 IAEA report contains the result of IAEA discussions with Iranian officials (though not, apparently, the former head of PHRC who according to UNSCR 1747 is Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi, also a senior scientist at MODAFL) during which Iran explains further its rationale for procuring the equipment and its role in university instruction. The same report discusses the PHRC’s alleged connection to the so-called alleged studies—research into nuclear weapons design. “During the meetings of 27–28 January and 3–5 February 2008, the Agency asked Iran to clarify a number of procurement actions by the ERI, PHRC and IAP which could relate to the above-mentioned alleged studies. These included training courses on neutron calculations, the effect of shock waves on metal, enrichment/isotope separation and ballistic missiles.”
See also Lavisan-Shian page.
Pishgam Company
Pishgam Company
Little is known about the Pishgam company. UN Security Council Resolution 1803 (2008) states that it was involved in the construction of the uranium conversion facility at Esfahan. As a separate matter, the IAEA’s May 2008 report notes that it continues to seek information from Iran regarding the design of a PUREX-based process for the AEOI. Purex is a reference to the process used for recovering uranium or plutonium from spent reactor fuel.
Sanam Electronic Industry Group
Sanam Electronic Industry Group
Sanam Electronic Industry Group in Tehran was another DIO-associated facility involved in the manufacture of centrifuge components.
Shahid Hemat Industrial group (SHIG)
Shahid Hemat Industrial group (SHIG)
The Shahid Hemat Industrial Group (SHIG) arises first in the February 2008 IAEA report recounting discussions with Iran over the procurement activities of the Physics Research Center. In 1988 the head of SHIG was approached on behalf of Tehran University for help in procuring a mass spectrometer for educational purposes. According to Iran, the mass spectrometer was never delivered.
More relevant to Iran’s alleged nuclear weaponization efforts, the May 2008 IAEA report cites a March 3, 2003 document from Dr. Fakhrizadeh to to Shahid Hemat Industrial Group (SHIG) management, referring to the “Amad Plan” and seeking assistance with the prompt transfer of data for “Project 111”. For more regarding Fakhrizadeh and his role in Iran’s weaponization efforts, see MODAFL and notes from the February 2008 IAEA briefing to UN missions.
According to UN Resolution 1737 (2006), SHIG is a subordinate entity to the Aerospace Industries Organization, which conducts research and development on ballistic missiles.
Tehran Nuclear Research Center
Jabr Ibn Havan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL)
One of the primary facilities at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TCNC) is the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL) where Iran conducted many undeclared nuclear activities. JHL has been the site of many nuclear research and development activities, including using shielded glove boxes/hot cells; a uranium metal purification and casting laboratory; mass spectrometer and laser laboratories; and facilities for the testing of uranium purification and conversion processes. JHL also contains nuclear waste disposal facilities.
Iran conducted a range of activities using undeclared, imported uranium in forms including uranium oxide (UO2), uranium tetrafluoride (UF4), and uranium hexafluoride (UF6). When the IAEA intensified its investigations in Iran in February 2003, it found that JHL used undeclared UF4 imported from China to make uranium metal. The conversion equipment used in that project has been dismantled and stored. Iran has told the IAEA that small amounts of imported UO2 were prepared for targets at JHL, and were irradiated at the Tehran Research Reactor. Glove boxes at another lab at TNRC were used for plutonium separation experiments using these irradiated targets. Those glove boxes were then moved to JHL, and subsequently moved to Esfahan.
A UF6 container inspected at JHL was first found to be missing a few kilograms of UF6. Iran initially declared that the container had leaked, but following environmental testing at other facilities, including Kalaye Electric, Iran was forced to admit that this material had been used in centrifuge testing.
Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility)
The Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility), completed in 2005, at TNRC is a laboratory for the production of radioisotopes of molybdenum, iodine and xenon from natural uranium oxide irradiated in a research reactor. Iran started construction on the MIX Facility in 1995. It contains hot cells which could be used for small scale plutonium separation activities. Because Iran’s largest research reactor, the Tehran Research Reactor, does not have the neutron flux required to produce the isotopes that would then be separated in the MIX facility, this facility is unable to operate as planned.
Between June 1987 and February 1999, while the plant was still under construction, Iran declared it irradiated gram quantities of the undeclared UO2 imported from China in the TRR in about 50 experiments, and sent it to the MIX Facility for separation of I-131.
Radiochemistry Laboratories of TNRC
The Radiochemistry Laboratories contained a glove box for radioisotope separation. Iran has declared to the IAEA that neither the laboratory nor the radiochemistry section of TNRC still exists. They said that the glove box used at the facility was moved to a warehouse at Esfahan in 2000.
Iran declared to the IAEA that it had carried out UF4 conversion experiments on a laboratory scale during the 1990s at the Radiochemistry Laboratories using imported depleted UO2 which had previously been declared as having been lost during processing. Iran told the IAEA that material related to uranium conversion had been produced during bench and laboratory scale experiments at the Radiochemistry Laboratories and at Esfahan.
Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
The Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) is a 5 megawatt-thermal (MWth) pool-type light water research reactor. The United States supplied the TRR to Iran in 1967 and weapon-grade uranium fuel for the reactor. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspects this reactor.
After the 1979 revolution, Iran was no longer able to procure replacement fuel from the United States or Europe. In 1987, the AEOI paid Argentina’s Applied Research Institute (INVAP) $5.5 million to convert the reactor’s fuel from 93 percent enriched uranium to slightly less than 20 percent enriched uranium, just below the cutoff for highly enriched uranium (HEU). (A timeline of the fuel requirements for the Tehran Research Reactor can be found here: Argentine Low-Enriched Uranium at the Tehran Research Reactor) The reactor has been operating with LEU fuel since 1993.
Of the original U.S.-supplied fuel, about 7 kilograms of irradiated HEU remains stored at the reactor site. Iran likewise is storing irradiated Argentine-supplied LEU
The reactor has operated at 3 MW-th, partially due to a shortage of fuel. The Tehran Research Reactor is expected to run out of Argentine-supplied fuel at the end of 2010 or sometime in 2011.
Iran used this reactor to conduct activities possibly linked to early efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Without notifying the IAEA Iran irradiated uranium oxide (UO2) targets in the TRR and separated plutonium in glove boxes at Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) laboratories. Iran also admitted to producing small amounts of polonium-210 in the TRR in the early 1990s through the irradiation of bismuth targets. Polonium 210 is a well-known radioactive material used in a beryllium-polonium neutron initiator that starts the chain reaction in a nuclear weapon. Iran claims that the polonium was produced as part of a study of the production of neutron sources for use in radioisotope thermoelectric generators and not for use in a nuclear weapons neutron initiator. The TRR was under traditional safeguards at the time of the undeclared plutonium experiments and polonium production. This type of safeguards is not designed to detect such small-scale activities.
Fuel Swap Proposals
Tehran Research Reactor Fuel Requirements
Uranium Mining
Ardakan yellowcake production plant
The mill or Yellowcake Production Plant at Ardakan processes the ore from the Saghand mine into uranium ore concentrate (yellowcake). It is designed to process 50 tonnes of uranium per year, a capacity matching that of the Saghand mine. The mill is scheduled to begin operations at the start of mining at Saghand. The installation of the infrastructure and processing buildings at Ardakan began in 2004.
Gchine Mine and Mill
The Gchine mine is located in southern Iran near Bandar Abbas. The associated mill is located on site. The estimated production capacity for the mine is 21 tonnes of uranium per year. Questions were raised by the IAEA regarding the ownership of the mine and its relationship to Iran’s military. A detailed description of the IAEA’s discussions with Iran regarding the mine’s provenance and current status is contained in the February 2008 IAEA report.
The Saghand Mine
The Saghand Mine, located in Yazd in central Iran, is designed to extract low grade hard rock ore bodies through conventional underground mining techniques. The annual estimated production output of the mine is 50 tonnes of uranium.
According to IAEA reports, Chinese experts assessed that the mine contains approximately 1,000 tons of uranium. For some perspective on what this means, high-grade ore-bodies contain as much as 20 percent Uranium (U). Low-grade bodies contain 0.1% U. Concentrations under 0.075% (750 ppm) are generally considered uneconomical to mine1. Iran’s ore falls under this category, with concentrations of only 553 ppm.
