Nuclear Sites
Kalaye Electric Company (also known as Kala Electric)
Kalaye Electric Company (Kala Electric)
According to IAEA reports (based on interviews of Iranian officials), Kalaye Electric, located in Tehran, was Iran’s primary centrifuge research, development, and manufacturing site until operations moved to the Natanz site in 2002. The name “Kalaye Electric” means “electric goods,” implying that it kept the name to help disguise the true purpose of the facility.
Iran declared that Kalaye Electric became the primary P-1 centrifuge development and testing site after such work was moved in 1995 from the TNRC. The IAEA has reported that between 1997 and 2002, Iran assembled and tested P1 centrifuges at Kalaye. Iran also admits to introducing UF6 gas into a centrifuge for the first time in 1999 and, in 2002, fed nuclear material into a small, 19-machine cascade. Iran used 1.9 kg of imported, undeclared Chinese UF6 to test centrifuge machines at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop between 1999 and 2002, before dismantling the centrifuge test facility at the end of 2002.
After the pilot fuel enrichment plant (PFEP) at Natanz became the primary centrifuge research and development facility, Kalaye Electric remained a component manufacturing site. Investigation into the site began after the publication of information about possible enrichment activities. The first organization to name the facility publicly was the National Council for Resistance of Iran (NCRI).
Following the public revelation of Kalaye Electric, media reports indicated that U.S. satellite imagery showed considerable activity at the site, suggesting that equipment was removed from the site, raising suspicions that Iran was attempting to hide activities before granting access to the IAEA. The IAEA asked to visit Kalaye in February 2003 and to take environmental samples to determine if any enriched uranium was produced at the site. Iran responded that the facility was a watch factory, but that it also made a few centrifuge components. It initially denied the inspectors’ requests to take environmental samples, claiming that it did not have to allow access until Iran implemented the IAEA additional protocol.
Iran subsequently relented and allowed the IAEA limited access in March 2003 and full access in May, but it refused to permit environmental sampling until August 2003. Iran took extraordinary steps to disguise the past use and purpose of this facility, including removing equipment and moving internal walls. Nonetheless, the IAEA was able to detect enriched uranium at this site, further pressuring Iran to declare fully its activities there and elsewhere
site imagery
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Date: Sep 15, 2008
Photo Type: Ground 
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Date: Jan 30, 2005
Photo Type: Satellite 
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